24 December 1944

No letter today. Just this:

Christmas Message from the President, 24 December 1944

CLICK TO ENLARGE


HEADQUARTERS
FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 230
006/71 (AGM)                                                                               24 December 1944

SUBJECT:   Christmas Message from the President.

TO            :   Corps, Division and Separate Unit Commanders

         The following message from the President will be disseminated to military personnel within your command exclusive of ill and wounded:    

 

"TO: The men and women of the Armed Forces:

           On behalf of a grateful nation, I send to the men and women of our Armed Forces everywhere warm and confident good wishes this fourth Christmas of war. On Christmas Day more than on any other day, we remember you with pride and with humility; with anguish and with joy. We shall keep on remembering you all the days of our lives. It is, therefore, with solemn pride that I salute those who stand in the forefront of the struggle to bring back to a suffering world the way of life symbolized by the spirit of Christmas.

(signed)  FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
Commander-in-Chief"

                              By command of Lieutenant General HODGES:

                                                                                                         R. S. MOURSE
                                                                                                         Colonel, AGD,
                                                                                                         Adjutant General.
DISTRIBUTION:
         "C"

 

* TIDBIT *

about The Siege of Bastogne (continued)

The information that follows was excerpted from The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge, part of the "European Theater of Operations" portion of the U.S. Army in World War II, written by Hugh M. Cole and published by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army in 1965, Chapter XIX, page 474.

The morning of 23 December had broken clear and cold. "Visibility unlimited," the air-control posts happily reported all the way from the United Kingdom to the foxholes on the Ardennes front. To most of the American soldiery this would be a red-letter day-long remembered-because of the bombers and fighter-bombers once more streaming overhead like shoals of silver minnows in the bright winter sun, their sharply etched contrails making a wake behind them in the cold air.

In Bastogne, however, all eyes looked for the squat planes of the Troop Carrier Command. About 0900 a Pathfinder team dropped inside the perimeter and set up the apparatus to guide the C-47's over a drop zone between Senonchamps and Bastogne. The first of the carriers dropped its six parapacks at 1150, and in little more than four hours 241 planes had been vectored to Bastogne. Each plane carried some twelve hundred pounds, but not all reached the drop zone nor did all the parapacks fall where the Americans could recover them. Nevertheless this day's drop lessened the pinch-as the records of the 101st gratefully acknowledge.

Airdrop to Resupply Bastogne

The airdrop on the 23d brought a dividend for the troops defending Bastogne. The cargo planes were all overwatched by fighters who, their protective mission accomplished, turned to hammer the Germans in the Bastogne ring. During the day eighty-two P-47's lashed out at this enemy with general-purpose and fragmentation bombs, napalm, and machine gun fire. The 101st reported to Middleton, whose staff was handling these air strikes for the division, that "air and artillery is having a field day around Bastogne."

The German attack on the 23d was mounted by the 26th Volks Grenadier Division and the attached regiment left behind by Panzer Lehr. Lacking the men and tanks for an assault around the entire perimeter, General Kokott elected to continue the fight at Senonchamps while attacking in two sectors diametrically opposite each other, the Marvie area in the southeast and the Flamierge area in the northwest. The Germans were becoming desperate.

On both sides of the line daylight of the 24th was spent in regrouping, punctuated with heavy gusts of artillery and mortar fire whenever the opponent showed signs of movement. Once again, however, a beautiful flying day gave the Americans an edge. P-47 's belonging to the 512th, 513th, and 514th Squadrons of the XIX Tactical Air Command worked around the Bastogne perimeter. At one point, the bombing was so close to the airborne lines that the 101st sent frantic word to the VIII Corps asking that the flight leader be told to call off the mission.

Early in the afternoon the VIII Corps relayed a message from General Patton and the Third Army: "Xmas Eve present coming up. Hold on." But there were more tangible items to lessen the nostalgia and depression of the surrounded garrison on Christmas Eve. The second day of air resupply had been "a tremendous morale booster" - so reported CCB and most of the regiments. Allied air activity on the 24th had heartened the men on the ground. When night fell they could see the fires left as aftermath of the fighter-bomber strikes blazing all the way round the perimeter. Less obtrusive but of considerable impact was the confidence that the commanders and the troops had in each other; a lesson for future commanders may be read in the considerable effort put forth by McAuliffe, Roberts, and the regimental commanders to apprise all the troops of the "situation."

Christmas Eve in the German headquarters brought forth some cognac and a few "Prosits" but in the main was devoted to preparations for a major attack on Christmas Day. The XLVII Corps had been informed that the 9th Panzer Division and 15th Panzergrenadier Division would come under corps control on 24 December, and the 3d Panzergrenadier Division would arrive later, but the Fuehrer had other ideas. Earlier in the day the Fifth Panzer Army commander posed a question which finally reached Jodl and Hitler: should he turn to finish off Bastogne or continue, with the bulk of his divisions, toward the Meuse and seize the Marche plateau in an attempt to widen the German thrust? Hitler's answer, finally relayed by Model, was that the attack to seize the Marche plateau should be continued with all available forces. This answer did nothing to relieve Manteuffel's worries about his thin and endangered southern flank. To leave Bastogne as a sally port onto his left rear made no military sense to this experienced soldier. Therefore, Manteuffel ordered that Bastogne be taken on 25 December.

During the night of 24 December, German combined arms and infantry attacks by pessimistic commanders and uninspired soldiers were uncoordinated and failed. Twice during the night of 24 December, however, the Luftwaffe retaliated with very damaging bombing sorties on Bastogne and the surrounding area, killing a Belgian nurse and a score of wounded paratroopers.

Street in Bastogne After Luftwaffe Strike

23 December 1944

V-MAIL

438^th AAA AW BN

APO 230 % Postmaster, N.Y.

Germany

23 December, 1944

Dearest Sweetheart –

Another Saturday, another weekend coming up - and so what? At least it’s one less to sweat out, dear. We got to reminiscing last nite and thinking of the various bars around town – the Merry-Go-Round, Statler etc. I thought about the Sheraton Roof, the Vendome – yes and of Nile’s Oasis. Oh well – they’ll all be there when I get back and we’ll visit them all – in one night.

By the way, sweetheart – I hope you’re not letting some of the news you’re hearing get you down. As usual – this outfit retains the good luck – so please don’t worry. Everything is fine right here and don’t forget, we still have the best damned Army in the world.

Mail is nihil, darling, but it’s sure to start up again one of these days. Anyway – I love you, you love me and that is all that matters.

Best regards

My deepest love, darling –

Greg

Route of the Question Mark


[CLICK TO ENLARGE]

(A) Stolberg, Germany to (B) Failon, Belgium (68 miles)
also showing (C) Bastogne, Belgium (38 miles from Failon)

December 23... Failon, Belgium. We took up our position to hold back the Nazi push and we took part in the Battle of the Bulge. The cold, miserable Christmas there, and the dinner that we ate sitting on our helmets in an unheated barn. The Cafe where the communications section established itself, and Capt RENKIN's hideaway in the milkroom of a barn. Mr. BROWN drew pictures on the ceiling of one of the houses and Chaplain TURGEON had a service on Christmas Eve in the village church. T/5 SARACINO asked a British soldier, "Do you speak English?" The soldier replied, "A little, I'm Scotch!!!"

* TIDBIT *

about "Einheit Steilau"

From the start of the planning for the their Ardennes offensive, the Germans gave great importance to seizing intact the Meuse River bridges. To accomplish that, Hitler ordered a special unit of English-speaking men wearing American uniforms and using captured US Army weapons and vehicles to be formed. They would infiltrate through the American lines ahead of the German armored advance to secure the bridges lying between Namur and Liege. Some of the men in the unit, disguised as American officers, would also create confusion by spreading rumors and false information across the enemy rear area. The code name given the sinister plan was "Operation Griffen."

To lead the bold undertaking, Hitler turned to the most famous commando of World War II, Otto Skorzeny. Considered by British intelligence to be "the most dangerous man in Europe," he had by 1944 already achieved fame by leading the mission that snatched Mussolini from imprisonment in a mountaintop fortress the year before. Later he kidnapped the son of Hungarian leader Nicholas Horthy, thereby insuring that regime’s continued loyalty to the Axis. The six-foot Austrian, who wore the Iron Cross around his neck and a dueling scar across his left cheek, was personally briefed by the Führer on his forthcoming assignment on 22 October 1944. He had five weeks to form his new unit, to be designated 150th Panzer Brigade.

Otto Skorzeny

As part of the 150th Panzer Brigade, Skorzeny organized a company of "special" (Einheit) teams under overall command of SS Capt. Helmut Steilau. Those 150 soldiers included the best of the brigade’s English speakers outfitted fully with US uniforms and equipment. Their effort was spearheaded by nine jeepborne commando parties.

The overall mission of "Einheit Steilau" was to: 1) use demolition squads of 5 or 6 men each to sabotage bridges and US supply depots; 2) use 3- and 4-man reconnaissance teams to conduct intelligence sweeps, concentrating on Allied movement and concentrations west of the Meuse; and 3) send 3- and 4-man lead groups directly in front of the main German Panzer advance to issue false orders to enemy troops, prevent unwanted bridge destruction, switch road signs, cut telephone lines and create fake minefield markings to hinder US movement.

The greatest success of the Steilau teams didn’t result from what they actually accomplished, but from the confusion and uncertainty generated by their mere existence. In General Omar Bradley’s words: "Half a million GIs were forced to play cat and mouse with each other each time they met on the road." The authenticating spot checks that began to be spontaneously carried out at roadside checkpoints proved embarrassing for those Americans unfamiliar with baseball, comic books or the current husband of Betty Grable. General Bruce Clarke was arrested by American MPs when he mistakenly placed the Chicago Cubs baseball team in the American League. Even Bradley, an army group commander, was detained for a while when he couldn’t convince one MP that Springfield was indeed the capital of the state of Illinois (the policeman mistakenly insisted it was Chicago).

In spite of the chaos they created, some of Steilau’s men were successfully challenged early on. On 18 December a group of commandos riding on a captured US self-propelled gun were shot down after explaining they were from a "company" of a nearby cavalry unit. The American guards at the checkpoint knew instantly soldiers from a cavalry unit would always refer to their unit as a "troop," never a company.

The jeep teams’ overall success rate might have been greater had they been able to secure more vehicles. That is, the US Army of 1944 was awash with transport. Travelling four to six in a jeep, the German commandos immediately looked conspicuous; seldom would so many GIs crowd into those small cars. That characteristic caused the jeep teams to be more easily spotted among the traffic flow once their existence became known. In all, 18 of Steilau’s men were captured and executed as spies by the Americans during the Ardennes fighting.

On 22 December 1944 four men from Otto Skorzeny's Einheit Steilau who had been captured in American uniforms had been tried and condemned as spies. One, who had informed on the others, was granted a stay of execution. General Hodges awaited written authority from Eisenhower through Bradley before ordering the execution to proceed in Eupen on 23 December 1944.

The condemned Gemrmans took the news bravely.

“Do you have a last request?” they were asked.

“Yes. You have some German women prisoners. We would like to hear Christmas carols.”

The request was granted. With the sound of the women's voices still in their ears, Skorzeny's spies were shot.

Two more captured spies were shot on the 26th and seven on the 30th. In all, 18 of Steilau's commandos were shot by their captors during the Battles of the Ardennes.

22 December 1944

438^th AAA AW BN

APO 230 % Postmaster, N.Y.

Germany

22 December, 1944       0920

My darling –

I don’t promise I can finish this but I’ll go as far as I can. I suppose I’ve sounded mysterious in my last couple of letters, dear – but it shouldn’t seem too much so. A good many facts must be apparent to you. You wrote not so long ago, that you had been looking over some of the pictures I had sent home and that you had re-read my letters of the past two months. From the latter you said you were able to get an overall picture; that you could tell when I had a hard day, or when there had been activity – or moving etc. I’m certainly glad you are able to get all that from a collection of my letters, darling – because it’s impossible to give you a more detailed picture in any single letter. You can also get a better idea by correlating the dates of my letters with the actual day it was written – rather than with the day you receive it – or them. That’s difficult to do – especially if a few weeks go by. You wrote also that it was wonderful that I could write every day. I think it is, too, dear – wonderful for me, because – whether you liked the tone of some of them or not, dear – I always feel my day is complete when I do write a letter to you. And when I miss a day, that day is a void one, dear.

We’ve been in a good many peculiar military situations since the day we landed and I didn’t have to miss many days. Let’s hope that the future will be no different. And talking about mail – it looks as if I’ll have a banner month in January – because we’re getting no mail at all these days. I’ve received not one letter from you, darling, dated December, and I have quite a few coming to me from November.

1235

Hello again sweetheart – and this time for only a few minutes, I’m afraid. I’ve had several things to look after and there’s more coming. There’s nothing much else of interest to write you about – that is – that I can write you about. Last night would have been relatively inactive for me but I had to go see an 82 yr old woman who fell down some stairs. The place was right behind our C.P. – so don’t worry dear. It turned out that she had a fractured hip; we had to splint it and we then evacuated her to the civilian hospital in this city.

Now, darling, I’ll have to knock off for now. I’ll try to write tomorrow. Be well, dear – and don’t worry about me – regardless of all the things you’re reading in the papers. I’m taking good care of myself for you – because I love you more than anyone in the world. So long for now, dear; love to the folks and

All my sincerest love –

Greg

* TIDBIT *

about "Nuts"

An airdrop of supplies planned for the 22d never reached Bastogne because bad flying weather continued as in the days past. All that the Third Army air liaison staff could do was to send a message that "the 101st Airborne situation is known and appreciated." Artillery ammunition was running very low. The large number of wounded congregated inside Bastogne presented a special problem: there were too few medics, not enough surgical equipment, and blankets had to be gathered up from front-line troops to wrap the men suffering from wounds and shock.

Improvised Emergency Ward
during Siege of Bastogne

Nonetheless, morale was high. Late in the afternoon word was circulated to all the regiments that the 4th Armored and the 7th Armored (so vague was information inside the perimeter) were on their way to Bastogne; to the men in the line this was heartening news. What may have been the biggest morale booster came with a reverse twist - the enemy "ultimatum."

The story was told in an interview by Patrick O'Donnell with Lieutenant General Harry W. O. Kinnard, who at the time of the Siege of Bastogne was a Lieutenant Colonel and Division G-3.

While we were still surrounded, on the morning of December 22, a German surrender party, consisting of two officers and two NCOs, and carrying a white flag, approached our perimeter in the area of our Glider Regiment, the 327th. The party was taken to a nearby platoon command post. While the enlisted men were detained the officers were blind folded and taken to the command post of the 327th where they presented their surrender ultimatum. The ultimatum in essence said the 101st's position was hopeless and that if we elected not to surrender a lot of bad things would happen.

The message was brought in to the Division Headquarters by Major Alvin Jones, the S-3, and Colonel Harper, the Regimental Commander. They brought the message to me, the G-3 and Paul Danahy, the G-2. My first reaction was that this was a German ruse, designed to get our men out of their fox holes. But be that as it might, we agreed that we needed to take the message up the line. We took it first to the acting Chief of Staff of the Division, Lt. Col. Ned Moore. With him, we took the message to the acting Division Commander General Tony McAuliffe. Moore told General McAuliffe that we had a German surrender ultimatum. The General's first reaction was that the Germans wanted to surrender to us. Col. Moore quickly disabused him of that notion and explained that the German's demanded our surrender. When McAuliffe heard that he laughed and said: "Us surrender? Aw, nuts!"

General Anthony McAuliffe
in Bastogne on 27 December 1944

But then McAuliffe realized that some sort of reply was in order. He pondered for a few minutes and then told the staff, "Well I don't know what to tell them." He then asked the staff what they thought, and I spoke up, saying, "That first remark of yours would be hard to beat." McAuliffe said, "What do you mean?" I answered, "Sir, you said 'Nuts'." All members of the staff enthusiastically agreed, and McAuliffe decided to send that one word, "Nuts!" back to the Germans. McAuliffe then wrote down: "To the German Commander, "Nuts!" The American Commander."

McAuliffe then asked Col. Harper to deliver the message to the Germans. Harper took the typed message back to the company command post where the two German officers were detained. Harper then told the Germans that he had the American commanders reply. The German captain then asked, "Is it written or verbal?" Harper responded that it was written and added, "I will place it in your hand."

The German major then asked, "Is the reply negative or affirmative? If it is the latter I will negotiate further."

At this time the Germans were acting in an arrogant and patronizing manner and Harper, who was starting to lose his temper, responded, "The reply is decidedly not affirmative." He then added that, "If you continue your foolish attack your losses will be tremendous."

Harper then put the German officers in a jeep and took them back to where the German enlisted men were detained. He then said to the German captain, "If you don't know what 'Nuts' means, in plain English it is the same as 'Go to Hell'. And I'll tell you something else, if you continue to attack we will kill every goddam German that tries to break into this city."

The German major and captain saluted very stiffly. The captain said, "We will kill many Americans. This is war." Harper then responded, "On your way Bud," he then said, "and good luck to you." Harper later told me he always regretted wishing them good luck.

21 December 1944

V-MAIL

438^th AAA AW BN

APO 230 % Postmaster, N.Y.

Germany

21 December, 1944

Hello Sweetheart!

It’s the 21st and supposedly the shortest day in the year, which suits me fine. It’s as dark, dismal and gloomy a day as we’ve had in a long time – several factors helping to make it so, darling.

I might as well tell you now, dear, that I’ll probably have to write V-mail letters for the next several days – although I may be wrong, of course. At any rate – I’ll keep something coming to you every day.

All else is O.K. Got another package yesterday – this time from Johnny Johnson who used to be adjutant of this outfit. He’s stationed in Atlantic City now – the lucky devil.

Nothing more I can write at the moment Sweetheart except to tell you I love you dearly and miss you terribly. My love to the folks.

My everlasting love –

Greg

* TIDBIT *

about The Siege of Bastogne (continued)

The ability of the 101st to sustain itself had been severely diminished on the night of 19 December when German raiding parties (some reported in civilian garb) surprised and overran the division service area around Mande-St. Etienne. Most of the quartermaster and ordnance troops made their way to the VIII Corps, but the raiders captured or killed most of the division medical company. Only eight officers and forty-four men escaped. This loss of doctors, aid men, and medical supplies was one of the most severe blows dealt the 101st. A number of transport vehicles also were lost, but about a hundred trucks had been sent to the rear for resupply and so escaped. However, very few of these got back to the 101st with supplies before the ring closed.

On 21 December, the American soldiers in Bastogne were outnumbered and lacking in cold-weather gear, ammunition, food, medical supplies, and leadership (as many officers, including the 101st's commander—Major General Maxwell Taylor—were elsewhere). Due to some of the worst winter weather in years, the surrounded U.S. forces could not be resupplied by air nor was tactical air support available. Visibility was often measured in yards.

The German Fifth Panzer Army and XLVII Corps had decided that the Panzer Lehr Division should take Bastogne on the 20th while the other forces continued their westward advance. It was believed that, with advances continuing north and south of the town, Bastogne would soon be encircled and that the 26th Volksgrenadier Division following the Panzer divisions could capture it. Indeed, the town was surrounded on the twenty-first, but the 26th Volksgrenadier Division was not strong enough to take it. Though surrounded, the 101st was not cut off. The division still maintained communication with VIII Corps and knew an American relief column was pushing toward them as German advances along the entire Western Front were diminishing. The Fifth Panzer Army refused to authorize sufficient additional forces to take Bastogne and to keep the faltering offensive alive. But the 26th Volksgrenadier Division still had the mission, with some help from the Panzer Lehr Division. On the evening of 21 December, the commanders composed this now famous surrender note to be delivered the next morning:

To the U.S.A. Commander of the encircled town of Bastogne.

The fortune of war is changing. This time the U.S.A. forces in and near Bastogne have been encircled by strong German armored units. More German armored units have crossed the river Our near Ortheuville, have taken Marche and reached St. Hubert by passing through Hompre-Sibret-Tillet. Libramont is in German hands.

There is only one possibility to save the encircled U.S.A. troops from total annihilation: that is the honorable surrender of the encircled town. In order to think it over a term of two hours will be granted beginning with the presentation of this note.

If this proposal should be rejected one German Artillery Corps and six heavy A. A. Battalions are ready to annihilate the U.S.A. troops in and near Bastogne. The order for firing will be given immediately after this two hours' term.

All the serious civilian losses caused by this artillery fire would not correspond with the well known American humanity.

The German Commander.

20 December 1944

438^th AAA AW BN

APO 230 % Postmaster, N.Y.

Germany

20 December, 1944       0855

My dearest darling –

I was lying in bed last night trying to get to sleep and as always, dear, I was thinking of you. For some reason or other you seemed clearer to me in my vision of you and that was a real treat. Even a picture seems so inadequate, darling, and the Lord knows I look at yours every hour of the day. I don’t know exactly why – but I see you most often just inside your doorway looking out at me. And then I see myself coming thru the doorway, taking you into my arms and hugging you tightly – but quickly – with a quick glance towards the street to see if anyone is watching. That’s the way it was, wasn’t it, dear? It’s a long time ago – but it seems to me that was the way it went. Another thing I think about a great deal is where you’ll be when I get back. I mean what the circumstances will be; Where will we land, where will people be able to meet us – where will you be when I hit town? One of the things I don’t think about is whether I’ll take a quick glance back to see if anyone is watching when I take you in my arms once again and hug and kiss you and well – hug and kiss you, dear.

Am I being premature, sweetheart? I suppose so – but it's so damned easy and pleasant to think about – you can’t exactly blame me. Of course – I still think as intently as before about what comes after that – our plans for marriage and getting set in Salem, but the more time goes by – the more I think about the minute details – such as how we’ll act the first few hours I’m home, how much I can be alone with you the first few days to talk over a million and one things. What a thrill, darling, when all that finally comes! It seems so damned far off – but after a year – I guess we’re enured enough to take it no matter how long it will be. One thing I’m aware of is that I don’t tell you often enough how much I appreciate your ability to take all this and still keep a stiff upper lip through it all. Whether I mention it or not, sweetheart – always know that I’ll be forever thankful for your fine spirit and courage – both of which have helped me more than I can say, dear.

Gosh I almost forgot to thank you for a second package I received from you, darling. I had forgotten that you had written you had sent two and it came as a complete surprise. It came in perfect condition and the contents were well chosen, I thought. I haven’t opened any of the cans as yet – but I’m looking forward to it, I’ll tell you. Our diet is good here – but of course it can’t include such delicacies as saltines, anchovies and sardines – and every now and then of an evening we get a bit hungry for something unusual. That will fill the bill excellently. Thanks again – dear.

In one of your letters you mentioned something about postcards etc and saving them and that reminds me of something awful. I had 4 more rolls of film taken since we hit Germany and I sent them in to a Belgian city to have them developed. Everyone has been doing it. But one day – G2 of Corps or Army came thru town, visited all the photo shops and confiscated all films on hand. Boy was I and am I still mad! But there’s not a damned thing I can do about it. They’re just gone and that’s all. I had some swell pictures too – although I couldn’t have sent them all to you right now for they included pictures of parts of the Siegfried Line etc. Well – I’ve got plenty more rolls and I’ll just keep taking pictures and holding on to them until war’s end.

Well – darling – I started this early to get ahead of sick call and I’ve done pretty well so far. Right now I’ve got several patients waiting for me – so I’ll have to stop. Be well, dear and take good care of yourself for me. My love to the folks and for now – so long.

My everlasting love, dear –

Greg

* TIDBIT *

about The Siege of Bastogne

CLICK TO ENLARGE

The goal of the German offensive was the harbor at Antwerp. In order to reach it before the Allies could regroup and bring their superior air power to bear, German mechanized forces had to seize the roadways through eastern Belgium. Because all seven main roads in the Ardennes mountain range converged on the small town of Bastogne, control of its crossroads was vital to the German attack. Bastogne was defended mainly by the 28th Infantry Division, which had seen continuous fighting from 22 July-19 November, before being assigned to this relatively quiet area. The Allies believed only an infantry division was present opposite the 28th Infantry, and they believed any attack along this sector would be limited in scale.

The commander of the 5th Panzer Army gave the XLVII Panzer Corps the responsibility of capturing Bastogne, before crossing the Meuse near Namur. The plan was to attack a 7 mi (11 km) front with three divisions: the 26th Volksgrenadier and the Second Panzer would lead the assault, with the Panzer-Lehr-Division behind them. Opposing this significant force were two battalions of the 110th Infantry Regiment (the third was held back as a division reserve), responsible for a 9 mi (14 km) front along the Our River.

The Allied forces were gathered into small groups at major villages, with outposts along the river manned only during the daytime. With forces too thin to maintain an even battle line, they focused on the four roads that crossed the Our River. Due to heavy rain preceding the German attack, only the northernmost road, which crossed the Our at Dasburg on its way to Clerf and Bastogne, was in good enough condition to be used as a crossing point. The 2nd Panzer Division crossed the river along this road, while the 26th Volksgrenadier Division constructed a bridge near Gemünd for its crossing. The Panzer-Lehr Division pushed forward toward Bastogne as soon as the other troops had crossed the Clerf River.

On the evening of 15 December, the 26th Volksgrenadier established an outpost line on the west bank of the Our. The German artillery began bombarding the American positions, knocking out telephone lines, as the infantry started to advance. The Germans attacked swiftly, their advances made possible by sheer weight of numbers. German engineers completed bridges over the Our before dark on the 16th, and armor began moving to the front, adding to the Germans' vast numerical superiority. Still, the Germans were significantly delayed by the American defenders — their plan to cross the Clerf River by nightfall on the first day was delayed by two days.

By the end of the second day of battle, it became apparent that the 28th Infantry was near collapse. Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton, commander of VIII Corps, ordered part of his armored reserve, Combat Command B (CCB) of the 10th Armored Division (United States) to Bastogne. Meanwhile, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered forward the SHAEF reserve, composed of the 82nd Airborne and the 101st Airborne at Reims. These veteran troops had served with distinction since the parachute drops in Normandy and were resting and re-equipping after two months of combat in the Netherlands. The 82nd—longer in reserve and thus better re-equipped—moved out first. The 101st left Camp Mourmelon on the afternoon of 18 December, with the order of march the division artillery, division trains, 501st, 506th and 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR), and 327th Glider Infantry.

The 101st Airborne was routed to Bastogne, located 107 mi (172 km) away on a 1,463 ft (446 m) high plateau, while the 82nd Airborne took up positions farther north to block the critical advance of Kampfgruppe Peiper toward Werbomont. The 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion was ordered to Bastogne to provide anti-tank support to the armorless 101st Airborne on the 18th and arrived late the next evening. The first elements of the 501st PIR entered the division assembly area 4 mi (6.4 km) west of Bastogne shortly after midnight of 19 December, and by 09:00 the entire division had arrived.

Approaching Bastogne
20 December 1944

On 19–20 December, the 1st Battalion of the 506th PIR was ordered to support Team Desobry (Maj. William R. Desobry), a battalion-sized tank-infantry task force of the 10th Armored Division assigned to defend Noville, north-northeast of both Foy and Bastogne just 4.36 mi (7.02 km) away. With just four M18 Hellcat tank destroyers of the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion to assist, the paratroopers attacked units of the 2nd Panzerdivision, whose mission was to proceed via Monaville (just northwest of Bastogne) to seize a key highway and capture, among other objectives, fuel dumps necessary for the Germans to continue moving on their counter-offensive. This action destroyed at least 30 German tanks and inflicted 500 to 1,000 casualties on the attacking forces in what amounted to a spoiling attack.

The heavy losses inflicted by the tank-destroyers induced the German commander into believing the village was being held by a much stronger force and he recoiled from further attacks on the village, delaying the German advance and setting the stage for the Siege of Bastogne just to the south by giving the 101st Airborne Division enough time to organize defenses around the city. By the time the 1st Battalion pulled out of Noville on the 20th, the village of Foy, half-way to Bastogne center, had been captured from the 3rd Battalion by a separate attack, forcing the 1st Battalion to then fight its way through Foy. By the time 1st Battalion made it to the safety of American lines, it had lost 13 officers and 199 enlisted men, out of about 600 troops, and was assigned as the division reserve. Team Desobry lost a quarter of its troops and was reduced to just four medium tanks when it passed through the lines of 3rd Battalion.

The 101st Airborne formed an all-round perimeter using the 502nd PIR on the northwest shoulder to block the 2nd Panzerdivision, the 506th PIR to block entry from Noville, the 501st PIR defending the eastern approach, and the 327th GIR scattered from Marvie in the southeast to Champs in the west along the southern perimeter, augmented by engineer and artillery units plugging gaps in the line. The division service area to the west of Bastogne had been raided the first night, causing the loss of almost its entire medical company, and numerous service troops were used as infantry to reinforce the thin lines. CCB of the 10th Armored Division, severely weakened by losses in delaying the Germans, formed a mobile "fire brigade" of 40 light and medium tanks. Three artillery battalions—including the all-black 969th Field Artillery Battalion—were commandeered and formed a temporary artillery group. Each had twelve 155 mm (6.1 in) howitzers, providing the division with heavy firepower in all directions restricted only by its limited ammunition supply. Colonel Roberts, commanding CCB, also rounded up more than 600 stragglers from the rout of VIII Corps and formed Team SNAFU as a further stopgap force.

As a result of the powerful American defense to the north and east, the XLVII Panzer Corps commander decided to encircle Bastogne and strike from the south and southwest, beginning the night of 20/21 December. German Panzer reconnaissance units had initial success, nearly overrunning the American artillery positions southwest of Bastogne before being stopped by a makeshift force. All seven highways leading to Bastogne were cut by German forces by noon of 21 December, and by nightfall the conglomeration of airborne and armored infantry forces were recognized by both sides as being surrounded.

The siege was on.

19 December 1944

V-MAIL

438^th AAA AW BN

APO 230 % Postmaster, N.Y.

Germany

19 December, 1944       1020

Dearest sweetheart –

Well – I have to resort to this after all, dear – but let’s blame it on the military situation. I’ve really been and still am – quite busy, darling – and glad

No mail yesterday – but quite a number of packages – none for me, this time. Despite everything – we’re planning a regular big Christmas celebration here – and already have a big tree set up here. We found some decorations and lights and the tree is beginning to look real nice.

I wonder how things are at home and what kind of Christmas you’ll have. It’s so long since I’ve had a sort of recent letter from you, dear – I seem to be out of contact with things at home. But I hope you have a pleasant day – and by the way – how about New Year’s Eve, sweetheart? I hope you have something planned. Whatever you do, I’ll be with you in everything but person – dear. All for now, darling. My love to the folks – and

My deepest love and affection –

Greg

* TIDBIT *

about Trenchfoot

Thousands of soldiers in November and December of 1944 were treated for non-battle casualties, the most common being "trench foot," so named in World War I as it was experienced by men in the trenches. This undoubtedly is part of what kept Greg so busy in these wintry days of battle.

The winter of 1944-45 was the coldest and wettest in years, and the wet cold, combined with the tactical situation, created conditions most favorable for the development of trench foot and frostbite. Moreover, two points of view prevailed about the possibility of a winter campaign in Europe, neither of them conducive to preparations for the prevention of cold injury. Historically, decisive military campaigns had not been fought in western Europe during the cold winter months. On the other hand, it was the opinion, at least in certain circles, during the summer and early fall of 1944, that the war would end before winter. Thus, staffs were not psychologically attuned to the need for large supplies of special combat clothing, footgear, and other winterizing equipment, or to the necessity for an extensive program for the prevention and control of cold injury when there was time. A calculated risk also was taken by command decision to bring forward ammunition, gasoline, and other combat requirements to the exclusion of winter clothing and footgear.

What follows has been extracted from The Annals of Surgery, August 1946; Vol. 124, Issue(2), pages: 301–313.

"Trench foot" is a diagnostic term used by the U. S. Army Medical Corps to describe the cold injury resulting from prolonged exposure to just above freezing temperature (340 to 400 F.). It has occurred almost exclusively in combat infantry riflemen who were forced into immobility by enemy action. "Frost-bite" is the term used to describe the cold injury resulting from exposure to below-freezing-temperatures-either "ground type" occurring in the ground forces, or "high altitude type" occurring in combat air crews. "Immersion foot" designates the cold injury resulting from prolonged exposure of the feet to cold water. For administrative reasons, these injuries are described as different clinical entities, but it now appears that they all produce similar pathologic changes and can be treated identically.

Following the early November offensive, and again after the German counter-offensive in December, I944, the U. S. Army casualties increased at an alarming rate, several weeks reaching 50 per cent of battle casualties. During the Lorraine campaign, 20 in November 1944, the 328th Infantry Regiment had to evacuate more than 500 men as casualties from trench foot and exposure during the first 4 days of one engagement; this number exceeded the number of battle casualties.

TOTAL MONTHLY ADMISSIONS TO HOSPITALS ON CONTINENT
(Europe Only)

                                  Battle         Trench Foot and Frost-bite
                                 Injuries                    Injuries                

    Nov. 1944 .........     41,793                      6,869
    Dec. 1944 .........     37,336                     11,469

In trench foot, the sequence of events leading to the injury followed a fairly constant pattern. The combat infantry soldier is forced into immobility in a wet foxhole for a prolonged period of time. During this period, he first notices tingling or complains of a stinging sensation in his feet, which may become quite intense. After a period of exposure, the feet become numb and finally anesthetic, "like blocks of ice." When the attack is ordered, or he is relieved, walking causes severe burning pain; and on the removal of his shoes, the feet become swollen and warm. Three factors were always present in the carefully examined cases. First, wet cold; second, a prolonged exposure in a relatively immobile position; and third, physical activity following the exposure. Of these factors, wet cold is undoubtedly the most important. Peak casualties always followed periods of wet cold weather.

The secondary etiologic factors which combine with wet cold to produce the final injury are important since they are often correctable. Combat activity was always followed by an increase in trench foot casualties. Fifty per cent of the soldiers were injured in their first combat experience. Proper and adequate foot gear was unavailable in 8o per cent of the casualties during the November, I944, offensive. After the U. S. Army overshoe was issued, this foot gear proved inadequate in many instances. The important fact that a boot should be designed for rapid removal is not considered in the standard American and British foot gear. Soldiers repeatedly use this excuse for their failure to replace wet socks under combat conditions.

First and Second Degree Trench Foot
    

Third Degree Trench Foot
2 days, 2 weeks, 4 weeks and 6 weeks after exposure

Constriction of the foot and ankle by improperly fitted shoes was difficult to evaluate. Many soldiers complained that their "shoes felt too small after several days of exposure" but the first sign of cold injury is edema and probably caused this complaint. Prolonged dependency and immobility of the feet appeared important in a few cases occurring in tank crews and artillery squads. These soldiers alone had either dry feet (tank crews) or were in a position to maintain an adequate rotation policy. This suggests that dependency and immobility increase the susceptibility of the feet to cold injury. The soldiers with a history of previous foot trouble, either cold injury or other conditions, sustained milder injuries than the entire group examined. Only 20 per cent suffered second- or third-degree injuries as compared to 63 per cent with similar injuries for the entire group. In other words, previous foot trouble made the soldier "foot conscious" and medical aid was requested early.

The most important correctable secondary factor is an improved rotation policy for troops during combat activity. If a few men are relieved for only an hour daily from each group, adequate foot care could be required under supervision, if necessary. This was almost impossible when the tactical situation required troops to wade streams and "dig in" until relief arrived. Company commanders most successful in avoiding casualties under these circumstances, required each soldier to exchange old wet socks for clean dry ones when daily food rations were issued. This often required the mess sergeant to deliver food and clean socks from foxhole to foxhole during the hours of darkness.

Soldiers reporting into Battalion Aid Stations with "cold feet" should be immediately sent to a nearby "Restoration Area" for at least 24 hours' observation. Experienced clinicians have difficulty in estimating the degree of injury until the reactive hyperemia or inflammatory reaction develops. In the Restoration Area, the most important point in the evacuation chain, all "cold feet" should be given a cold foot bath and placed in a cool dry bed. Warm food and drink should he given to restore normal body temperature and gradual, slow restoration of normal blood flow of the feet. External heat, walking or vigorous massage is avoided at this period. Slow restoration of blood flow will avoid stasis in the capillary bed which subsequently leads to skin necrosis.

Here is an article about trench foot published by TIME magazine, 01 January 1945 titled "Medicine: Again, Trench Foot"

Europe's mud and slush of October and November caught the U.S. Army with its feet unprepared. Result: up to Dec. 12, 17,500 G.I.s had developed trench foot, something no one expected in World War II (partly because no one expected the war to settle down into mud and trenches).

Trench foot is a sort of mild frostbite that results from letting feet stay cold and damp for a long time. Shelter foot and immersion foot (TIME, May 10, 1943) are essentially the same thing. Circulation slows or stops, feet turn white and numb, sudden warming causes painful burning. The devitalized tissues may recover if kept cool and dry for a few days or weeks. But in some cases blisters develop and becomeinfected, even cause gangrene, amputation or death. Many victims who emerge with feet intact can never fight again because their feet ache on long hikes and are very sensitive to cold.

Boots and Massage. In contrast to U.S forces, the British have no trench-foot problem, even though they have been actually wading through Holland. Their stout workmen-type boots and gum boots have turned out to be drier than anything the U.S. has produced. But the most important factor is that British soldiers are required to keep their boots waxed, to massage their feet with oil and change frequently to dry socks.

Most U.S. soldiers have tramped the mud in rubber-soled, rough-side-out leather combat boots (fairly water-repellent if coated in a waxy substance called dubbing); some had only ordinary G.I. boots with legging extensions (an extremely soggy combination); a few had galoshes. Most trench-foot casualties occurred because officers and men were still careless about dubbing and foot massage, and did not bother with dry socks or galoshes.

Already the trench-foot rate has been cut 75% simply by making the G.I.s take care of their feet, even in battle. Men are learning to dry their socks on bushes or in their jackets or helmets. In some forward areas, dry socks are issued along with rations. Now improved boots are on the way. They are the Quartermaster Corps' new calf-high shoe-pacs, synthetic rubber up to normal shoe height and leather the rest of the way, designed to be worn with two pairs of heavy socks. Production began in August and a few shoe-pacs have already been issued to the troops fighting under the worst conditions.

Discipline and Massage. The Germans have not licked the problem (in one group of 46 captured German casualties, 14 had trench foot) but the Russians have—thanks to long experience and rigid discipline. All Russian soldiers are paired off, required to massage each other's feet regularly; and the man whose massage buddy gets trench foot catches hell.

18 December 1944

438^th AAA AW BN

APO 230 % Postmaster, N.Y.

Germany

18 December, 1944       1055

Hello darling!

I started to write you a V-mail and changed my mind. This may be a shortie – but I’d rather write that then a V-mail – if possible. You may gather that I’m pretty busy, dear – and I am. If you can recall the date when you receive this – you’ll know why. But everything is going along well enough and there’s nothing to worry about.

Yesterday didn’t seem like Sunday at all – and honestly – all the individuality that Sunday used to have – is fast disappearing. I can’t explain exactly why – but that’s the way it seems to be.

Again I got no mail from you, but I did get a V-mail from Lawrence – still at Holloran General. He didn’t write his new address so I’m unable to answer him for the time being. And I got a letter from the MD friend of mine in Italy with the 5th Army – and boy did my mouth water. A good many of the MC’s are being reassigned to jobs in the States – but of course those fellows have been overseas for some time now. This fellow – for example – came to England in Nov. '43, then went to Africa and then to Italy, where he’s been for longer than a year. So I guess he deserves a trip home. Boy – how I’d love a little trip home like that! How long would it take us to get married, dear??

Well – I got two more packages yesterday, too. One was from Lawrence – a box of cigars he mailed a long time ago – and they were welcome. I’ve been smoking some German stogies I got the time I got the wine I wrote you about and boy, you have to be real tough to smoke them – which – of course – I am dear! The other package was a real surprise; it was from Mary and Bob Richardson – you remember them in Marblehead? I hadn’t heard from them in a long while.

I haven’t been able to keep up with my correspondence these past few weeks and I have a whole mess of letters to answer – but they’ll just have to wait for awhile. Things will be quiet again. It’s strange – but with everything all mixed up etc – Special Service still tries to function – and it’s a good thing too – because one or two hours relaxation is almost a necessity at times. I heard our officer mention at breakfast that he was trying to get a new picture “Conflict” with Humphrey Bogart – which I understand is very new and had it’s première – here on the front – not so long ago.

Darling – I’ve been writing very swiftly to get this written – so excuse some of the writing – but I really have to stop now and get this sealed. Perhaps tomorrow I’ll be able to write with more concentration. That will depend on a few factors. For the time being, then, so long – sweetheart. My love to the folks – and don’t forget – I’m forever the fellow who loves and wants you for himself alone –

My deepest love – dear

Greg

* TIDBIT *

about The Counteroffensive Surprise
in the Choice of the Ardennes

CLICK TO ENLARGE

The Ardennes, Belgium and Luxembourg

The information that follows was excerpted from The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge, part of the "European Theater of Operations" portion of the U.S. Army in World War II, written by Hugh M. Cole and published by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army in 1965, Chapter IV.

The area through which Hitler chose to launch his counteroffensive was, with the exception of the Vosges, the most difficult terrain on the entire line of the Western Front. It consists of two major parts, the Eifel and the Ardennes. Although the Ardennes has given its name to the Battle, this area should be lumped with that of the Eifel to the east, thickly covered with forests, providing good cover from air observation even in the fall and winter.

Hitler's selection of the Ardennes for launching the western counteroffensive was based mainly on the obvious advantage of attacking the Allies where they were weakest. The cover and deception plan, personally devised by Hitler, turned on a half-truth. A part of the strategic concentration would be made in the Rheydt-Jülich-Cologne area east of Aachen. Here the preparations for the counteroffensive would be paraded before the Allies. The main actor in this play was the Sixth Panzer Army. Ostensibly its headquarters remained northwest of Cologne. Four of the armored divisions assigned to this headquarters also assembled in this area. The intensification of rail and road traffic which began here about mid-November was only partly concealed. Much movement was made in daylight. Radio traffic was increased commensurate with troop concentration. Additional antiaircraft battalions came into the area and with them special allotments of ammunition to produce a thickening of fire which the Allied air forces could not possibly fail to notice.

In contrast to this northern concentration, that in the Eifel was the product of secrecy carried to the limit. The Eifel terrain was well adapted to concealment. Thick forest cover cloaked its slopes, its valleys and plateaus. Small villages, singly not worthy of aerial investigation but in sum capable of harboring large forces, offered excellent dispersal. Camouflage had become second nature with the German soldier in the west-indeed since Normandy the art of camouflage had become the science of survival, and the Eifel made this task relatively easy. Strict traffic regulation confined all rail movements and road marches to hours of darkness. Special security detachments prowled the Eifel, and woe to the commander who allowed a vehicle park to grow beyond normal size. A radio blackout was thrown over the concentration area except for those units actually facing the enemy in the covering positions. No artillery registration was permitted except by guns in the line, and even they were limited to a few rounds per day. Reconnaissance was confined to a handful of higher officers; combat patrolling on the Ardennes front was almost entirely limited to nighttime search for American patrols.

Whatever thought may have been given to the Ardennes, the Allies were on the offensive and preparing for yet greater offensive operations well to the north and the south of the VIII Corps sector. Losses during November had been high and the reserve of new divisions in the United States was running low (in the United Kingdom such a reserve no longer existed). The old military axiom that the line cannot be strong everywhere applied with full force to the Allied positions reaching from Switzerland to the North Sea. Almost automatically Allied strength would concentrate in those areas where the offensive was the order of the day and where decision might be reached. The Ardennes sector seemed no special risk. It offered - or so it seemed - no terrain attraction for the enemy, and there was no recognizable indication that enemy forces opposite the VIII Corps and 99th Infantry Division outnumbered those deployed on the friendly side of the line. If there was a "calculated risk," therefore, it was no more precise or specific than that taken wittingly by any commander who thins his front to mount an attack while knowing that he has over-all superiority and the ability to retain the initiative. It long had been an article of faith in Allied strategy that Germany would make its greatest efforts in defense of what Eisenhower had called the two hearts of Germany: the Ruhr, the industrial heart, and Berlin, the political heart.

The Ardennes had been a quiet sector of the Western Front since the Allied dash across France had halted in September. The German divisions identified here as fairly permanent residents were battle weary, understrength, and obviously in need of rest and refitting. At various times fresh divisions had appeared opposite the VIII Corps, but their stay had been brief. By December it had become axiomatic, insofar as US intelligence was concerned, that any new division identified on the VIII Corps front was no more than a bird of passage en route to the north or the south. As a result the Ardennes assumed a kind of neutral hue in American eyes. Important happenings, it seemed, transpired north of the Ardennes and south of the Ardennes, but never at the division point itself.

Was there any warning note sounded for the VIII Corps and its troops in the line during the days just prior to the German onslaught? With the advantage of hindsight, seven items can be discerned in the corps reports for the period 13-15 December which might have given the alarm. Two divisions, the 28th and 106th, sent in reports of increased vehicular activity on the nights before the attack. The 28th discounted its own report by noting that this was the normal accompaniment of an enemy front-line relief and that the same thing had happened when a German unit had pulled out three weeks before. The 106th was a green division and unlikely to know what weight could be attached legitimately to such activity. In fact one regimental commander rebuked his S-2 for reporting this noise as "enemy movement." A third incident occurred on 14 December when a woman escapee reported to the 28th Infantry Division commander that the woods near Bitburg were jammed with German equipment. Her answers to questions posed by the division G-2 apparently were impressive enough to gain the attention of the VIII Corps G-2 who ordered that she be taken to the First Army headquarters.

The woman arrived there on 16 December.

The four remaining incidents attach to the capture of German prisoners on 15 December, two each by the 4th and 106th Infantry Divisions. The time of capture is important: two at 1830, one at 1930, and one at an unspecified time thereafter. All four claimed that fresh troops were arriving in the line, that a big attack was in the offing, that it might come on the 16th or 17th but certainly would be made before Christmas. Two of the prisoners were deserters; they themselves did not take the reported attack too seriously since, as they told their captors, all this had been promised German troops before. The other two were wounded. One seems to have made some impression on the interrogators, but since he was under the influence of morphine his captors decided that further questioning would be necessary.

Of the seven incidents which in retrospect may be considered signposts pointing to an impending attack on the VIII Corps front, only four were reported to the corps headquarters. Three of the four prisoners seemed to be parroting wild and baseless rumors of a sort which was fairly common, and these three were bundled into prisoner of war cages without further ado. The incidents reported to the VIII Corps were forwarded to the First Army and duly noted by that headquarters on 14 and 15 December. Only one incident was deemed worthy of 12th Army Group attention. This, one of the reports of extraordinary traffic, was mentioned in the commanding general's briefing as confirmation of the predicted relief of the 326th Infantry Division.

This briefing began at 0915 on 16 December.

What of air intelligence, the source of Rundstedt's greatest worry? Bad weather during the first half of December did reduce the number of Allied reconnaissance sorties flown east of the First Army front but by no means produced the kind of blackout for which the enemy hoped. In the month prior to the Ardennes attack the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Group, supporting the First Army, flew 361 missions of which 242 were judged successful. From the 10th through the 15th of December the group flew 71 missions with varying degrees of success; for example, on 14 December planes flown over Trier by the 30th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron reported the weather clear, but two hours later a second mission ran into haze and was able to see very little. Only one day, 13 December, in the five critical days before the attack found all US air reconnaissance grounded.

The pilots belonging to the 67th Group and the 10th Photo Reconnaissance Group, the latter attached to the Third Army's old partner, the XIX TAC, actually constructed an imposing picture of German buildup west of the Rhine in the month preceding the Ardennes counteroffensive. In the last week of November the number of enemy columns on the roads showed a marked increase. On 30 November US reconnaissance planes reported a drastic heightening of rail activity west of the Rhine and this was confirmed by the fighter-bombers flying "armed-recce." Special indications of forthcoming attack were numerous: a large number of hospital trains on the west bank of the Rhine, several groups of flatcars carrying Tiger tanks, and fifty searchlights in one location. Lights representing large-scale night movements were consistently reported, although the two available night fighter squadrons were so badly understrength (averaging no more than ten P-61's operational) that their contribution perforce was limited.

On 15 December the Allied air commanders' conference at SHAEF convened to review the big picture. Here the SHAEF G-3 told the assembled airmen that the Roer dam operations had failed to provoke a move by the main enemy armored reserve; as for the VIII Corps front, "nothing to report." Then the A-2 rose to sketch the activities of the Luftwaffe: it had continued the movement westward, closer to the battlefield, which had been noted in recent days, but all this was "defensive" only. The prelude to the Ardennes counteroffensive of 16 December can only be reckoned as a gross failure by Allied ground and air intelligence. One of the greatest skills in the practice of the military art is the avoidance of the natural tendency to overrate or underestimate the enemy. Here, the enemy capability for reacting other than to direct Allied pressure had been sadly underestimated. Americans and British had looked in a mirror for the enemy and seen there only the reflection of their own intentions.