26 July, 1944 (to her parents)

V-MAIL

438^th AAA AW BN

APO 403 % Postmaster, N.Y.

France

26 July, 1944

Dear Mother and Dad B –

I’m going to cheat a bit and write you a combined letter. It’s not because I couldn’t find something to write you individually – but because it takes less time – I have been busy of late.

Hearing from you and realizing that despite my having been away – I am close to you – makes me feel swell. These past couple of weeks I’ve been thinking so much about last summer and how I got to know Wilma and her folks. My thoughts end up so nicely when I realize that I am in fact engaged to Wilma – and I hope strongly that neither of you feels that it has been too difficult for her. If it has been a strain – I promise I’ll make it all up to her once I get back.

Things here – all in all – haven’t been too bad – and only occasionally not very pleasant. My work at the hospital – about which you know from Wilma – has been a wonderful time and also grand experience – which – considering I still belong to the 438th – has been a lucky break.

Well – that’s all for now. Keep well, don’t worry and I’ll be seeing you all one of these days. Love to Wilma, regards to the family.

Love

Greg.

* TIDBIT *

about Continuing Operation Cobra

CLICK ON MAP TO ENLARGE

The dotted lined rectangle shows the
limit of the saturation bombing area
just south of the road from Périers to St. Lô

From the "World War II Database" comes this excerpt:

American artillery officer Donald Bennett recalled the morning of 25 Jul when the bombing by 1,500 aircraft started:

Across three hours nearly every combat-capable plane in western Europe came in, starting with medium B-25s and B-26s, followed by the lumbering B-17s and B-24s, while a thousand or more fighters circled around the edge of the action, pouncing on any target of opportunity. The ground rolled from the concussion, smacking through the soles of our feet, pillars of smoke and dirt rising thousands of feet into the air.

Unfortunately, more "friendly" bombings occurred on the 26th. A total of 600 tons of bombs was released. The excerpt continues:

The earlier waves of bombs were dropped on top of Germans as planned, but as the smoke and fire blurred boundaries, bombardiers of the final few waves had a tough time figuring out where the Germans were. As a result, some of the bombs landed on top of American units. US Army Lieutenant Charles Scheffel and his unit was among those bracketed by friendly fire.

On my left, a crashing boom slammed me against the side of my foxhole and bounced me off the quaking ground. Pain knifed into my ears and squeezed air out of my lungs. I sucked in dirt and choked trying to breathe. Spitting, I opened my mouth against the deafening roar. Mother of God, they were going to kill us all.... I prayed somebody somewhere was on the horn telling these guys what they were doing to us down here.

150 Americans were killed by accident by these bombs. The highest ranking fatality of this massive friendly fire incident was a three-star general of the US Army, "blown out of his slit trench some two miles behind where I had been holed up," recalled Scheffel.

Here is an interview with Lt. Ray Holmquist, 120th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Battalion, about his experience during the "friendly" bombing:

"I mean the bombers were flying over in formation, it was a site to behold. And we were up there watching this fantastic armada. And my god I was looking up and here you could see a few bombs come out. I thought my god I have to take cover and I took cover in our battalion Headquarters. Our battalion headquarters had a heavy log, a fortification built into the hedgerow kind of wedged shaped and you get in through the side, just one small entry. It’s heavily timbered and its really good protection. And fortunately for me, that was the shelter I jumped into. It happened to be right next to me. Gees, I took the first cover I could get which was that shelter. I crawled in there and I think there were 7 others and I just laid on top of them. And by god, that shelter was hit with a 500-pound concussion bomb and the whole thing collapsed. The whole thing collapsed and there were big mounds of dirt on top of the timbers. The whole thing collapsed and somehow I was on top of the guy who I had been laying on top of. And they were buried and there was one other guy with me, just two of us. I could hear them, I think there was seven guys in the shelter, seven or nine, and they were buried. I could hear them down there and I tried to dig for them but it was an impossible task. I found my way out and got help. We got Captain Skier out, he was the S1, and he was still alive and he was put in an ambulance but all the rest of them were dead. As luck would have it or as bad luck would have it for Captain Skier the ambulance that he got into was bombed by our own troops and Captain Skier was killed. I mean that is a pretty hairy experience and there was so much confusion in our battalion I don’t know how we ever did take off. I got totally separated from the battalion. I was trapped there for quite awhile and digging for these guys and by the time I got out of there the battalion commander and all of his staff were gone. I was just kind of rambling, roaming around there, didn’t know really where I was or anyone else was.

Where was I to go? There wasn’t anything to do about anything. (Laughing) It was total chaos like you can’t believe. There is all kinds of dead and many wounded we had to take care of. You have to take care of the wounded and the dead. So I was really on my own. The battalion staff had disappeared and I didn’t know where they were. And here there was big take off and we were supposed to go 8 miles down the road to this city. Here I was wandering around in this hedgerow country basically all alone. Shit all I know is that our mission was to go down this road; I didn’t even know where the road was. I was just roaming around there all the rest of that day. I didn’t go out at night I took cover. I just search the next day. I knew the direction of the battle and I followed the direction of the battle and it was destruction like you couldn’t believe. It was utter, utter destruction. There was nothing that lived, burning tanks and burning vehicles, dead animals, dead Germans, dead Americans. I was just alone. I mean there were troops all over but I didn’t know where my battalion was. There were other American troops all over the place but they were all part of an organization and they didn’t care about me. There were vehicles and troops all over but I didn’t know where is my battalion."

Immediately after the bombings, the American 4th, 9th, and 30th Infantry Divisions charged into German lines even as smaller bombers and fighters continued to attack German positions further beyond the line. "The few Germans who were encountered were out of their heads with shock," recalled Bennett as his M-7 artillery pieces went in. Indeed, the elite Panzer Lehr Division lost much effectiveness with some of their tanks overturned and two thirds of personnel becoming casualties of the bombing. The advancing infantry divisions gained 12,000 yards on 25 and 26 July, supplying the mobile breakthrough to occur on 27 July.

CLICK ON IMAGES TO ENLARGE

Reconnaissance for 2nd Armored Division in Canisy
(5.5 miles from St. Lô) after American artillery
bombardment on 26 July 1944
(This photo came from PhotosNormandie's Flickr Photostream)


German Panzer Lehr Panther XXX destroyed by
Operation "Cobra" bombs on 25 July 1944


Another Panzer Lehr Panther III destroyed and
enemy captured during Operation "Cobra"
on 26 July 1944

24 July, 1944 (2nd letter)

[Note from FourthChild: No letter on the 25th
so I saved this 2nd letter of the 24th for today.]

438^th AAA AW BN

APO 403 % Postmaster, N.Y.

France

24 July, 1944         2100

My darling wife-to-be –

Home? A real meaning to me? How can I ever possibly put into words what that word really means? It is the embodiment of everything I dream about, think of, want, live for. Home is something that the Lord somehow doesn’t let us appreciate when we have it – and yet makes us miss it so sorely when we’re away from it. And when I know what’s waiting for me there – well sweetheart, I just can’t write what I feel.

I suppose, dear, I do sound different in my letters than I did in February and March – but I am different, too – and the life I’ve experienced in the past several weeks has made it so. But about you, and home – if I feel different, it’s only because I miss you and want you more strongly. Maybe some of my hurried letters don’t intimate as much, but please try to remember, darling, that I sometimes write you of a day – when I shouldn’t be writing; but I don’t feel right, either, if I don’t jot down even a few words to you each day. War is a rotten business and certainly will change a lot of men – but darling – I don’t think it will change doctors because they’ve seen a lot of misery and human destruction in their work – and this is just more of the same. War usually ends up in terms of territory gained or lost; actually the soldier on the field gets little of that impression; what he sees and what hardens him is the cheapness of life and for him war is expressed in terms of how many of his men were killed or wounded – as against the enemy. At least that’s the way I see it. So don’t worry, darling, about my seeming different. If I am, it’s only because I miss you more acutely than I ever did before and sometimes feel bitter because I can’t be with you yet.

This evening I got 3 letters of yours – 10, 11, 12th of July. That’s good! I enjoyed them immensely an darling – I hope you’re not too lonesome. I think your plan of getting a couple of weeks off is excellent and I hope you’ve done just that by now. To realize also that you and my folks are getting along so well – is wonderful for me, dear, because I feel that at least you’re not completely wasting your time.

You imply you have an idea of where I am and generally speaking you’re correct, dear. But remember – as the map moves – so do we. We are not stationary.

As for experiences – yes I’ll have a lot to tell you if you won’t tire of listening. Sweetheart – I don’t know what other fellows can be writing about what they’re doing – that I’m not. You should have a pretty good picture of my activities by now. Up to noon time – I’ve been spending my time with the battalion – usually visiting one of the batteries each day. That means traveling a few miles in various directions – because they’re spread out, checking on sanitation, health, diet, etc. After lunch – I head for the hospital and stay there until mid-evening usually; anywhere from 1800 to 2100. I have been doing surgery there – as I wrote you; lots of it and it’s been a wonderful opportunity. By the time I return (the hospital is quite a distance behind us now) I do a few odd things and then it’s time for bed. If my outfit moves during the day – as it does about every 3-4 days – when I return, I have to dig in. That’s all there is, darling, nothing more – day in and day out. We listen to the news as often as we can and get just as excited about it as you. Often we find out by radio what has happened during the day – happened just a few miles from us.

CLICK ON IMAGE TO ENLARGE

Soldier receiving mail in a camouflaged foxhole

Sweetheart – that’s about all for now. It’ll be getting dark soon and I have a couple of things to take care of. You must know, dear, how much I miss and love you; I can’t tell you too often. I dream only of us and my return and I, too, feel it won’t be too far off – so keep your chin up darling and before you know you will wake up to find me beside you –

Love to the family and

All my love is yours, dear

Greg.

24 July, 1944

V-MAIL

438^th AAA AW BN

APO 403 % Postmaster, N.Y.

France

24 July, 1944        1030

Dearest sweetheart –

Happy Anniversary! And now we’ve known each other an entire year. I do wish we could be celebrating together, darling – but maybe next year we’ll really tie one on. Boy – I sure would like to get fried, boiled, stewed – or just plain stinko! But with you – of course. I’ve had a bottle of Cognac for weeks now and the only part that’s gone is that which I gave my boys the nite I got it. Some of the men over here are really doing some plain and fancy drinking – but I’ll still reserve my drinking for special occasions.

Last nite we had a chance to see a movie, again. “The Uninvited” – with Ruth Hussey and R. Milland – a fair story. We had a few interruptions – which made it even more weird. I got a letter from Mary – with medallions galore for Pete and me. Also got one from Lawrence – of July 10 – but none from you, darling. I wonder if our mail is being held up again – and for what purpose.

Work at the hospital is still quiet – but they work it that way i.e. they flood them with cases for about 2½ - 3 weeks and then ease off for about 10 days. We should start working again soon.

So long for now, sweetheart, remember I LOVE YOU – and that I’m very very glad I love you – to put it in simple terms!! Love to all.

All my love to you –

Greg

* TIDBIT *

about Operation Cobra's False Start

CLICK ON PICTURES TO ENLARGE

Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory had set the "Cobra" H-Hour at 1300, 24 July. On the morning of 24 July he went to Normandy to observe the operation and found the sky overcast with thick clouds. Deciding that visibility was inadequate for the air attack, he ordered a postponement. Unfortunately, he was too late. The message announcing his decision reached England only a few minutes before the actual bombing was to commence in France. Although the planes were ordered to return without making their bomb runs, it was impossible to get them all back. In accordance with the original planning, six groups of fighter-bombers and three bombardment divisions (about 1,600 heavy bombers) had departed their bases in England and headed toward France. Only the medium bombers, scheduled to bomb last, had not left the ground when the postponement order came. Of the six groups of fighter-bombers in the air, three received the recall order before they dropped their bombs. The other three bombed the general target area, a narrow strip, and certain targets north of the Périers-St. Lô highway, with no observed results. The postponement message to the heavy bombers kept back only a few planes in the last formation.

Ignorant that "Cobra" had been postponed, pilots of the great majority of the heavy bombers guided their big craft on toward the target. Because no precise radio channels had been designated for emergency communication, there was no certain means of transmitting the news of the postponement to these planes. While air force personnel in France attempted to get word to the craft aloft, the first formation of 500 heavy bombers arrived over the target area. Fortunately, they found visibility so poor that no attack was made. The second formation found cloud conditions so bad that only 35 aircraft, after making three bomb runs to identify the target, released their loads. Over 300 bombers of the third formation, with slightly improved weather conditions, dropped their bombs - about 550 tons of high explosive and 135 tons of fragmentation - before the postponement message finally got through to cancel the remainder of the strike.

The 24 July bombing was unfortunate, not only because of the likelihood of negating the surprise planned for "Cobra," but also because it killed 25 men and wounded 131 of the 30th Division.The tragedy was the result of one accident. The lead bombardier of a heavy bomber formation had had difficulty moving his bomb release mechanism and had inadvertently released a portion of his bombs over the wrong location. The fifteen aircraft flying in the formation followed his example and released their bombs. The bomb load fell 2,000 yards north of the Périers-St. Lô highway.

CLICK ON PICTURES TO ENLARGE

Dead and wounded of the 30th buried beneath an avalanche
of dirt thrown by the accidental bombing on 24 July 1944.
(Close-up, below)

Infantrymen and medics dig out a soldier half-buried
as a result of "friendly" aircraft hitting the 30th Division,
117th Infantry Regiment (also shown above).


Medics preparing the wounded for transport after
the bombing accident on 24 July 1944.

The bombardment accident released a flood of controversy. To provide additional protection for the ground forces, General Bradley had recommended that the planes make their bomb runs laterally across the front, parallel to the front lines, instead of approaching over the heads of American troops and perpendicular to the front. Recognizing that pilots preferred a perpendicular approach to minimize antiaircraft interference, he had suggested that the planes use the sun for concealment - if the attack occurred in the morning, the bombers could fly from east to west; in the afternoon, they could attack over a reverse course. In either case, the straight road between Périers and St. Lô would be an unmistakably clear landmark as a flank guide. Having expected a lateral approach to the target area, General Bradley was astonished and shocked when he learned that the planes had made a perpendicular bomb run. Using a perpendicular approach, Bradley said later, was an act of treachery on the part of the Air Forces, "a serious breach of good faith in planning." Other ground commanders had also anticipated a lateral approach, and their surprise was deepened by the horror that the news of casualties brought. But full agreement had never been reached.

On the ground, VII Corps had executed the initial part of the "Cobra" attack by withdrawing the front-line troops of the 9th and 30th Divisions several hundred yards to the north. The poor weather conditions had prompted commanders to wonder whether the lack of visibility would cancel the air bombardment, but General Collins was characteristically optimistic. He believed that the planes would get through the haze. Even if the heavy bombers were not able to take part in the air attack, he felt that the fighter-bombers would be on hand and that their bombardment would give sufficient impetus for the attack. He therefore told his subordinate commanders to go ahead. If the fighter-bomber effort proved insufficient, he expected the heavy bombers to return on the following day.

Word that the air bombardment had been postponed reached the ground troops just before the bombardment actually started. Why then had the bombs been dropped? Half an hour later General Collins learned that "Cobra" was postponed on the ground as well as in the air. However, Collins realized that the withdrawal of the 9th and 30th Divisions had created a vacuum that the Germans would fill unless the infantry returned to the vicinity of the Périers-St. Lô highway. Therefore, to prevent the enemy from moving north of the Périers-St. Lô highway, the three infantry divisions had to attack at 1300 as though "Cobra" were going into effect. In reality, the divisions were seeking to restore the front line that had existed before the air bombardment.

The abortive air bombardment on 24 July had obviously alerted the Germans to the American ground attack that followed. Enemy artillery fire began to fall in large volume. All three assault divisions had a difficult time that afternoon. On the corps right, the 9th Division committed its three regiments: the 60th Infantry battled enemy troops that had infiltrated behind the withdrawal; a reinforced battalion of the 47th Infantry struggled until dark to gain a single hedgerow; two battalions of the 39th Infantry fought eight hours to reduce a strongpoint and took 77 casualties. In the corps center, the 4th Division committed the 8th Infantry, which attacked in a column of battalions with tank support; after two hours of heavy fighting and a loss of 27 killed and 70 wounded, the regiment reached a point 100 yards north of the highway. On the corps left, the 30th Division did not advance at once because the assault elements were stunned and demoralized by the bombardment accident. It took almost an hour for the units to recover and reorganize, by which time enemy artillery fire had subsided. The division then advanced and reoccupied its original lines.

There was no time for recrimination on 24 July, for an immediate decision had to be made. Should General Bradley agree to another bombardment under the same terms and thereby indirectly condone the possibility of additional American casualties? Or should he insist on changing the pattern of air attack, which would mean postponing "Cobra" for several days at least? With higher headquarters anxious for action, General Bradley had little choice. The ground attack on the afternoon of 24 July had re-established the necessary "Cobra" conditions. Prospects for good weather on 25 July were improving. The question whether the premature bombing had lost the Americans tactical surprise was to be resolved at once: the Allies would launch "Cobra" again at 1100, 25 July.

23 July, 1944

V-MAIL

438^th AAA AW BN

APO 403 % Postmaster, N.Y.

France

23 July, 1944         1030

Good morning, darling –

It’s Sunday morning and right at the moment, I haven’t a thing to do. Pete dropped over a few minutes ago and when he saw I was writing you he asked me to be sure and send his best regards to you and to thank you for remembering him. I always pass on your regards, dear, but usually forget the reverse.

Everything sees to be going along well – although somewhat slowly in this sector at present. We haven’t been getting the best break in the weather – but we will soon. News from all other sources is so good – I actually worry about it. If it hasn’t much background – there will be an awful let-down. The fact is it can’t last too much longer, darling – and you now what that means. In case you don’t – it means that even with sweating out an Army of Occupation – I’ll be coming home to marry you. Gosh I hope we aren’t being too optimistic. For the time being there’s still plenty of fighting around here – I’m afraid – but we’ve got the Jerries number – and they know it.

No mail again – but maybe today, sweetheart. Hope all is well at home, my love to the folks – and

My deepest love, dear

Greg

* TIDBIT *

about Operation "Goodwood"

CLICK ON MAP TO ENLARGE

As a hush fell over the American front after the capture of St. Lô, intense activity began in the British sector. The British Second Army launched a strong attack, Operation "Goodwood", that promised the Allies an excellent chance of achieving a breakthrough. Had it succeeded, "Cobra" may not have been necessary.

"Goodwood" had grown indirectly out of the situation on the American front. At a conference on 10 July General Bradley had admitted to General Montgomery that he was discouraged about the offensive in the Cotentin Peninsula and that he was thinking of the new "Cobra" idea, not yet completely formulated. General Montgomery had advised him to "take all the time he needed" in the Cotentin. To assist, the British would continue the basic Montgomery pattern of action: attempt to draw the German strength away from the American sector, hold the eastern part of the front firmly and keep the enemy forces opposite the British engaged and off balance by limited objective attacks. Immediately after the conference, General Dempsey, the commander of the Second British Army, suggested that the British might take a more positive role in the campaign and launch a strong attack of their own. Montgomery's first reaction was negative, but on reflection he ordered planning started that same day. He alerted Dempsey to hold a corps of three armored divisions in reserve for a "massive stroke" east of the Orne River from Caen to Falaise. By 13 July three armored divisions were ready under control of the British 8 Corps.

By launching "Goodwood", the British would throw a left hook at the Germans; by following quickly with "Cobra" the Americans would strike with a right cross. The immediate objective of "Goodwood" was the rolling plain southeast of Caen, rising toward Falaise. Though neither Montgomery nor Dempsey mentioned Falaise specifically in their orders, they and other commanders were thinking of Falaise and even of Argentan as objectives perhaps quickly attainable if the battle developed favorably.

Meanwhile, to protect the open country around Caen, Eberbach, the German commander of Panzer Group West, had established a zone defense composed of infantry positions echeloned in depth and covered by antitank fire. The main battle positions, about 1,200 yards deep, consisted of three lines, while local reserves had organized another defensive line about a mile to the rear.

The two major deficiencies of the air bombardment launched earlier at Caen were to be corrected for "Goodwood". Only fighter-bombers were to attack in the zone where armored divisions were to make the main effort, and thus the extensive cratering that had slowed armor at Caen would be avoided. The ground troops were to attack immediately after the air strike in order to capitalize on the paralyzing effect of the bombardment on the Germans. While British naval units fired from the Seine Bay in support, bombers in the largest concentration yet utilized in direct support of a single ground attack loosed their explosives near Caen at daylight, 18 July. Almost 1,700 planes of the RAF Bomber Command and the U.S. Eighth Air Force, plus almost 400 medium and fighter-bombers of the U.S. Ninth Air Force, dropped more than 8,000 tons of bombs to open a path for British ground forces.

CLICK ON PICTURES TO ENLARGE

B-24 Liberator passes over area of mushrooming fragmentation
bombs, clearing out enemy troops and installations a few miles in
front of advancing British forces. Picture taken on 18 July 1944.

The 8 Corps of the Second British Army, employing three armored divisions, closely followed the air bombardment of 18 July and advanced over three miles in little more than an hour. Tactical surprise and the effect of the bombardment were responsible. Eberbach had not expected Montgomery, who had a reputation for caution, to make a major attack out of the narrow bridgehead he possessed east of the Orne. Even after the attack got under way, Eberbach could not really believe that it was the British main effort. Montgomery had achieved surprise by moving his assault divisions across the Orne only a few hours before the jump-off. With German troops destroyed or dazed by the bombardment, the divisions manning defensive positions in the bombed corridor were momentarily paralyzed. Despite valiant efforts to reorganize, they were unable to offer real resistance to the British armored attack. From about 0900 to noon, the 8 Corps was on the verge of achieving a clean penetration. Only when the British hit the enemy's antitank and flak guns on the last defensive line was the advance halted.

Recovering from the surprise by noon, Eberbach mobilized and committed four tank battalions and four infantry battalions of the 1st SS and 21st Panzer Divisions in a counterattack, which dispelled British hope of further immediate penetration. Though the British had lost 270 tanks and 1,500 men on the first day of attack, "Goodwood" continued on 19 July as the British endeavored to extend their gains by limited local attacks. Resistance continued strong, and the British that day lost 131 tanks and incurred 1,100 casualties. Further attempts to advance on 20 July, at a cost of 68 tanks and 1,000 casualties, resulted in little progress. When a heavy thunderstorm on the afternoon of 20 July turned the countryside into a quagmire, "Goodwood" came to an end. An ineffective German counterattack on 21 July signaled the close of the operation.

During the four-day attack, 8 Corps had secured thirty-four square miles of ground and the Canadian 2d Corps had captured the remainder of the city of Caen and part of the plain immediately to the southeast. The 8 Corps lost 500 tanks and over 4 ,000 men; tank losses in the entire operation totaled 36 percent of all British tanks on the Continent. Although territorial gains were small, particularly when compared with losses and with the expenditure of the air bombardment, Montgomery's attack by 20 July had exhausted Eberbach's reserves.

While the Germans, despite discouragement, were content that they had fought as well as they could, the Allies were far from happy. General Eisenhower had expected a drive across the Orne from Caen and an exploitation toward the Seine Basin and Paris. Montgomery had been more cautious in his anticipations. On the afternoon of 18 July, the first day of the attack, General Montgomery had been "very well satisfied" to have caught the enemy off balance. The effect of the air support seemed "decisive." The Second British Army had three armored divisions operating in the open country southeast of Caen, and armored cars and tanks, he thought, were threatening Falaise. Two days later, Montgomery judged that the purpose of the attack had been accomplished. The 8 Corps had advanced nearly six miles and taken 2,000 prisoners, all of Caen had been secured, and the Orne bridgehead had been more than doubled in size. General Montgomery on 20 July instructed General Dempsey to withdraw his armored troops into reserve and replace them with infantry.

To those in the Allied camp who had expected a decisive breakthrough and exploitation, expressions of satisfaction seemed hollow. Disappointment led General Eisenhower to write Montgomery on 21 July to question whether they saw "eye to eye on the big problems." He reiterated that the Allied needs were the Breton ports; increased space for maneuver, administration, and airfields; and the destruction of German military forces. He remarked that he had been "extremely hopeful and optimistic" that "Goodwood", by "tremendous air attack," would have a decisive effect on the battle of Normandy. That did not come about, and as a result, he was pinning his immediate hopes on Bradley's attack.

22 July, 1944

438^th AAA AW BN

APO 403 % Postmaster, N.Y.

France

22 July, 1944         0940

Dearest one –

Once upon a time Saturday meant a. no school, b. no p.m. classes, c. football games, d. a week-end off from interning, e. office hours in the p.m. and something to do in the evening. And now, dear, Saturday means nothing – nothing but another day to wait through, to leave behind.

I’m reading a book – or I did yesterday. There was a quotation in it, poet not given, and it went something like this:

“Four things greater than all things are,

  Women and horses and power and war.”

I don’t know about the horses, but the others strike home. There is nothing greater in my life at present sweetheart than a woman – you, dear – and the knowledge of you, what you mean to me now and what you are going to mean to me in the future – is certainly the greatest thing that has ever happened to me. How unfortunate that two other great things – power and war – have to stand opposed, preventing us from being together!

The last two days have been really dull and I’ve had plenty of time to think. And you know, dear, I had the opportunity of starting way back in the beginning and following us right up to the present. I was amazed mostly at how my life is now centered about one person in every thought I have; I’m amazed at how I’m filled with a love I never felt before for anyone the way I feel it for you. I know, darling, that I don’t express it often enough – but you’ll have to believe me when I say that the most agonizing part of the war for me has not been the sleeping in fox holes, the ducking low when evening shells are bursting, the fear which every honest person must admit pervades him when he realizes what might happen to him; no – none of these – terrible as they are, have bothered me so much as the haunting thought that I could be with you now, married to you, living as a normal couple should, loving you and doing things for you that would make you happy. I hate to think how I would have borne this war if I hadn’t been fortunate enough to meet you, love you, become engaged to you. Even the most moronic soldier wants to go home and seems to be fighting for just that and almost nothing more. You can imagine then, dear, how much a person who thinks a bit more deeply about it – feels.

I can’t seem to become imbued with the spirit of fighting for this freedom or that – although fundamentally I know that that is what I should be fighting for. But one can’t help become selfish and think in terms of his own small world – and darling, that world right now includes you and me and our families. I’m afraid that war – instead of giving me a broad perspective – is narrowing mine down.

Sweetheart – you must not gather from all this that I am unhappy; Quite the contrary. I’m trying to convey to you that I love you so deeply that I miss sorely my not being with you, talking with you, looking at you, hearing you laugh, holding you and kissing you – but despite my missing all that, I thank my lucky stars that I have someone like you to miss. I suppose that all sounds like a paradox and maybe I sound mixed up – so I’ll leave it right here –

The book I referred to above that I’m reading is “So Little Time” by J.P. Marquand. So far it’s excellent. If you get a chance – read it dear. It hits home – a good many times. The hospital has been slow the past couple of days and I’ve had a little breathing spell.

Everything is going along well here and I’m feeling fine and rested. Boy oh boy will I crush you when I see you! You’ll have to learn how to say uncle in almost 6 different languages. I’m going to love you so hard and so long that I wonder who is going to look after my practice.

Darling – no mail again yesterday – but surely today. One year ago today – on a Saturday (it was then the 24th) I met you – and it was certainly a lucky turning point in my life. My having been away makes little difference – dear – because I feel I know you and love you much more than even one year’s worth. And we’ll celebrate this anniversary, so help me – and many, many more.

I’ll stop now, sweetheart. I hope all is going well at home. Send my love to the family and

My deepest love is yours –

Greg

* TIDBIT *

about the Culin and Douglas Hedgerow Cutters

CLICK ON PICTURE TO ENLARGE

Culin Hedgerow Cutter

When a tank climbed over a hedgerow, its lightly armored belly was exposed to enemy fire while its guns could not be lowered enough to provide protection. A member of a light tank 102nd Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron of the 2nd Armored Division, Sergeant Curtis G. Culin, III, devised a sort of fork made of iron which could be attached to the front of a tank, thus enabling it to cut through a hedgerow rather than climb over it. Troops would then follow through the openings in the hedgerows to support the armor.

A maintenance expert in Culin's unit worked on the technical aspects of the problem and developed a four-pronged plow from angle iron that the Germans used on the beaches of Normandy. Soon the device was shown to the commanding general of the 2nd Infantry Division and Generals Gerow (V Corps) and Bradley (1st Army). General Bradley immediately ordered that everything be done to equip as many tanks as possible with the device before the final breakout was attempted. The hedgerow-breaching "tusks" led to the tanks being called "Rhino" tanks. Between 15 July and 25 July, when Operation Cobra started, over 500 Rhinos were manufactured. By the time the attack was launched, 3 of every 5 tanks which were to be involved had been modified. Tankers also added sandbags to provide added protection against the German shells. For his innovation, Sergeant Culin was awarded the Legion of Merit. Four months after his invention, he lost a leg to a land mine in the Huertgen Forest. When he returned to the United States, he became a salesman.

CLICK ON PICTURES TO ENLARGE

Curtis Culin, III

On 22 July, a modified M5A1 light tank was demonstrated to Gen. George S. Patton and a team from the 3rd Armored Division. After the demonstration, the division was ordered to build its own Rhino devices on a crash program. A workshop was set up in St. Jean de Daye under the supervision of Warrant Officer Douglas, who had been a professional welder in civilian life. Douglas didn't favor the Culin design, and devised a modified version that was distinguished by a pair of triangular plates at either end which he felt would penetrate the hedge better. A total of 57 of these 'Douglas cutters' were attached to tanks of the 3rd Armored Division prior to Cobra. The various types of Rhino devices were all considered top secret, and Bradley ordered that none be used until the main operation began.

These photos show the Douglas cutter with triangular plates.


The photo below shows a Douglas cutter being soldered onto a tank
in a square in the town of Saint Jean-de-Daye
on 26 July 1944, before the breakout.


St. Jean-de-Daye on 26 July 1944
while Greg was there...

Here is a video of that welding activity:

In fact, operational accounts of the 2nd Armored Division in Operation Cobra provide few indications that the devices ever played much of a role. This had more to do with the conduct of the fighting than with any technical virtue or failing of the Rhinos. The preliminary air attack against the Panzer Lehr Division left large craters making tank runs between hedgerows quite difficult. But these air attacks also shattered the main force opposing the 2nd Armored Division. As a result, the division aggressively pushed through the German defences. Rather than struggle cross-country through the bocage, the 2nd Armored Division used the country roads wherever possible, avoiding the need to use the Rhinos

21 July, 1944

V-MAIL

438^th AAA AW BN

APO 403 % Postmaster, N.Y.

France

21 July, 1944

My dearest sweetheart –

I am now sitting in the back of our big truck writing this V-mail to you. It happens to be the driest spot available at the moment – but it’s quite comfortable. As a matter of fact I’ve been rummaging around through some of my boxes and bags and I came across my clarinet and as soon as I’m through writing this – I think I’ll try blowing a few tunes out of it. Anyway – I ought to end up with more room here than there is now!

Greg's "large truck" may have been similar
to this 1/2 ton 4x4 WC54 Field Ambulance

I haven’t heard from you in a couple of days, now, dear, but that’s because of the recent mail set-up which should be corrected in another day or two. I thought so hard of you last night – it was almost impossible to stand it. I just wished so hard that you were with me or I with you – that I had to change my line of thought. Gosh, darling, I do love you a tremendous lot and I can hardly wait to get home and show you what I mean. But I will!! Hope you’re hearing from me regularly now. Love to the folks and

All my love, dear

Greg

* TIDBIT *

about A Quiet Period

CLICK ON PICTURES TO ENLARGE

(L to R) Lt Gen Omar Bradley 1st Army,
Maj. Gen Leonard Gerow V Corps
Gen Dwight Eisenhower,
Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force
Lt Gen Lawton Joseph "Lightning Joe" Collins,
VII Corps, on 21 July 1944

According to HyperWar's US Army in WWII: ETO Breakout and Pursuit written by Martin Blumenson:

Between the end of the earlier July offensive and the launching of COBRA, there was a lull for about a week. Not only did the period of inactivity permit plans to be perfected and the troops to be better organized for the attack, it also gave the men some rest and time to repair the equipment damaged in the battle of the hedgerows. Units were able to integrate replacements. By the time COBRA got under way, all the divisions on the Continent were close to authorized strength in equipment and personnel and most had undergone a qualitative improvement.

The quiet period before COBRA also made possible increased comforts such as hot meals, showers, and clothing changes. Even though B rations - a non-packaged food affording a variety of hot meals - had reached the Continent early in July and were ready for issue to the troops, the battle of the hedgerows had prevented their being substituted for combat 10-in-1, K, and C rations until later in the month. With kitchens set up to serve hot meals, "it was amazing how many cows and chickens wandered into minefields... and ended up as sizzling platters."

As Allied leaders searched rain-filled skies for a break in the clouds that might permit the air bombardment planned for COBRA, a phrase of the Air Corps hymn came to mind: "Nothing can stop the Army Air Corps." Nothing, they added, except weather. While impatient commanders waited anxiously for sunshine, and while General Bradley facetiously assumed the blame for having "failed to make arrangements for proper weather," the First U.S. Army rested and prepared for the attack.

20 July, 1944

V-MAIL

438^th AAA AW BN

APO 403 % Postmaster, N.Y.

France

20 July, 1944

Dearest darling –

Good morning! I’m getting an early start today because I expect to be busy a little later. No mail yesterday and probably none today.

Yesterday was another easy day at the hospital and it may be like that for another day or two. In the evening several of us went to a nearby quartermaster shower and saw something new in the line of Army efficiency. Before entering, we passed thru a tent and told a soldier what size underwear, and socks we wore. We were given new socks, underwear – shirts and shorts – plus a large-sized Cannon bath towel. We could keep our dirty clothes or discard them – as we saw fit. How’s that for up to date service?

All is quiet at present, sweetheart, and we’re enjoying our relaxation. I thought a great deal about you yesterday, dear, and last year and our meeting each other and of the first night I poked my head thru your door – and lots of other pleasant things that happened last summer. Best of all – I ended up by realizing that you are really my fiancée and that I have something real and lovely to come home to – and boy! that thought makes me very happy! I love you very much – darling. Never forget that!! Love to all at home.

All my love for now –

Greg.

Route of the Question Mark



(A) Deville to (B) St. Jean-de-Daye, France
11 July to 20 July 1944

From Page 24 from The Route of the Question Mark:

July 20... St. Jean de Daye.  We lost S/Sgt COOK, our mess Sgt. There was a false gas alarm which threw everyone into a panic. We witnessed the spectacular bombing operation on 25 July 1944. Wave after wave of B-17's and B-24's dropping bombs on the German lines ahead of us at Saint Lo. Pvt DAVIES joined the Infantry here.

* TIDBIT *

about the Failed Attempt on Hitler's Life

On 20 July 1944, an attempt was made to assassinate Adolf Hitler, Führer of the Third Reich, inside his Wolfsschanze (Wolf's Lair) field headquarters near Rastenburg, East Prussia. The plot was the culmination of the efforts of several groups in the German Resistance to overthrow the Nazi-led German government. The failure of both the assassination and the military coup d'état which was planned to follow it led to the arrest of at least 7,000 people by the Gestapo. According to records of the Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 4,980 people were executed, resulting in the destruction of the organized resistance movement in Germany.

Since 1938, conspiratorial groups planning an overthrow of some kind had existed in the German Army and in the German Military Intelligence Organization. Early leaders of these plots included Brigadier-General Hans Oster, General Ludwig Beck and Field Marshal Erwin von Witzleben. Oster was the deputy head of the Military Intelligence Office. Military conspiratorial groups exchanged ideas with civilian, political and intellectual resistance groups. Plans to stage an overthrow and prevent Hitler from launching a new world war were developed in 1938 and 1939, but were aborted because of the indecision of Army Generals Franz Halder and Walther von Brauchitsch, and the failure of the western powers to oppose Hitler's aggressions until 1939.

In 1942, a new conspiratorial group formed, led by Colonel Henning von Tresckow, a member of Field Marshal Fedor von Bock's staff. Their most important recruit was General Friedrich Olbricht, head of the General Army Office headquarters at the Bendlerblock in central Berlin, who controlled an independent system of communications to Reserve Units throughout Germany. Linking this asset to Tresckow's resistance group in Army Group Center created a viable coup apparatus. Tresckow systematically recruited oppositionists to the Group’s staff, making it the nerve center of the Army resistance. Tresckow and Olbricht formulated a plan to assassinate Hitler and stage an overthrow during Hitler's visit to the headquarters of Army Group Center at Smolensk in March 1943, by placing a bomb on his plane. The bomb failed to detonate, and a second attempt a week later at an exhibition of captured Soviet weaponry in Berlin also failed.

Henning von Tresckow

By mid-1943 the tide of war was turning decisively against Germany. The Army plotters and their civilian allies became convinced that Hitler must be assassinated so that a government acceptable to the western Allies could be formed and a separate peace negotiated in time to prevent a Soviet invasion of Germany. In August 1943 Tresckow met a young staff officer, Lieutenant Colonel Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg, for the first time. For some time this man's religious scruples had prevented him from coming to the conclusion that assassination was the correct way to achieve a negotiated peace. After the Battle of Stalingrad in December 1942, however, he had come to the conclusion that not assassinating Hitler would be a greater moral evil.

Olbricht now put forward a new strategy for staging a coup against Hitler. The Reserve Army already had an operational plan called "Operation Valkyrie" which was to be used in the event that the disruption caused by the Allied bombing of German cities caused a breakdown in law and order, or an uprising by the millions of slave laborers from occupied countries now being used in German factories. Olbricht suggested that this plan could be used to mobilize the Reserve Army for the purpose of a coup. In August and September 1943, Colonel Henning von Tresckow drafted the "revised" Valkyrie plan and new supplementary orders. A secret declaration began with the words: "The Führer Adolf Hitler is dead! A treacherous group of party leaders has attempted to exploit the situation by attacking our embattled soldiers from the rear in order to seize power for themselves." Detailed instructions were written for the occupation of government ministries in Berlin, Himmler's headquarters in East Prussia, radio stations, telephone offices, and other Nazi apparatus through military districts, and concentration camps.

During 1943 and early 1944 there were at least four failed attempts organized by von Tresckow and von Stauffenberg to get one of the military conspirators near enough to Hitler for long enough to kill him with hand grenades, bombs or a revolver: in March 1943, in late November 1943, in February 1944 and on 11 March 1944. But this task was becoming increasingly difficult. As the war situation deteriorated, Hitler no longer appeared in public and rarely visited Berlin. By the summer of 1944, the Gestapo was closing in on the conspirators. There was a sense that time was running out, both on the battlefield, where the Eastern front was in full retreat and where the Allies had landed in France on 6 June, and in Germany, where the resistance's room for maneuvering was rapidly contracting. The belief that this was the last chance for action seized the conspirators. By this time, the core of the conspirators had begun to think of themselves as doomed men, whose actions were more symbolic than real.

The conspirators scored a major coup in early July when they managed to initiate Erwin Rommel, the famed "Desert Fox," into their ranks. Rommel was by far the most popular officer in Germany, and was also the first active-duty field marshal to lend support to the notion of ending of Hitler's rule. However, although Rommel felt he had to, as he put it, "come to the rescue of Germany," he thought killing Hitler would make Hitler a martyr. Instead, he wanted him arrested and hauled before a court-martial for his many crimes.

On Saturday 1 July 1944 von Stauffenberg was appointed Chief of Staff to General Friedrich Fromm at the Reserve Army headquarters in central Berlin. This position enabled von Stauffenberg to attend Hitler's military conferences and would thus give him an opportunity, perhaps the last that would present itself, to kill Hitler with a bomb or a pistol. On 11 July von Stauffenberg attended Hitler's conference carrying a bomb in his briefcase, but because the conspirators had decided that Heinrich Himmler and Hermann Göring should be killed simultaneously, he held back at the last minute since Himmler was not present. By 15 July, when von Stauffenberg again flew to the Wolfsschanze, this condition had been dropped. The plan was for von Stauffenberg to plant the briefcase with the bomb in Hitler's conference room with a timer running, excuse himself from the meeting, wait for the explosion, then fly back to Berlin. Again on 15 July the attempt was called off at the last minute. Himmler and Göring were present, but Hitler was called out of the room at the last moment; von Stauffenberg was able to intercept the bomb and prevent its discovery.

Claus von Stauffenberg

On 20 July, around 12:30PM as the conference began, von Stauffenberg made an excuse to use a washroom where he used pliers to crush the end of a pencil detonator inserted into a 1 kilogram (2.2 pound) block of plastic explosive wrapped in brown paper. The detonator consisted of a thin copper tube containing acid that would take ten minutes to silently eat through wire holding back the firing pin from the percussion cap. He then placed the primed bomb quickly inside his briefcase, having been told his presence was required. He entered the conference room and placed his briefcase under the table around which Hitler and more than 20 officers had gathered. After a few minutes, von Stauffenberg received a planned phone call and left the room. It is presumed that Colonel Heinz Brandt, who was standing next to Hitler, used his foot to move the briefcase aside by pushing it behind the leg of the conference table, thus unwittingly deflecting the blast from Hitler, but causing his own death when the bomb detonated between 12:40 and 12:50, demolishing the conference room.

Conference Room Wreckage, 20 July 1944

Three officers and the stenographer were seriously injured and died soon after. Hitler survived, as did everyone else who was shielded from the blast by the conference table leg. Hitler's trousers were singed and tattered and he suffered from a perforated eardrum, as did most of the other 24 people in the room. Hearing the explosion and seeing the smoke issuing from the broken windows of the concrete dispatch barracks, von Stauffenberg assumed that Hitler was dead, climbed into his staff car with his aide Werner von Haeften and managed to bluff his way past three checkpoints to exit the Wolfsschanze complex. Werner von Haeften then tossed a second unprimed bomb into the forest as they made a dash for Rastenburg airfield, reaching it before it could be realized that von Stauffenberg could be responsible for the explosion.

Werner von Haeften

At 16:40 von Stauffenberg and von Haeften arrived at the Bendlerblock. Learning that Hitler had not died, Fromm, presumably to protect himself, changed sides and attempted to have von Stauffenberg arrested. As Remer regained control of the city and word spread that Hitler was still alive, the less resolute members of the conspiracy in Berlin also now began to change sides. Fighting broke out in the Bendlerblock between officers supporting and opposing the coup, and von Stauffenberg was wounded. By 23:00 Fromm had regained control, hoping by a show of zealous loyalty to save himself. Ludwig Beck, realizing the situation was hopeless, shot himself at the command of Fromm — the first of many suicides in the coming days. Although at first Beck only just managed to seriously wound himself, he was shot in the neck by soldiers. Fromm convened an impromptu court martial consisting of himself, and sentenced Olbricht, von Stauffenberg, von Haeften and another officer, Albrecht Mertz von Quirnheim, to death. At 00:10 on 21 July they were executed in the courtyard outside, possibly to prevent them from revealing Fromm's involvement. Fromm went off to see Goebbels to claim credit for suppressing the coup. Goebbels' only reply to him was "You've been in a damned hurry to get your witnesses below ground." Fromm was immediately arrested and later, in March of 1945, was executed on charges he had failed to report and prevent the coup on 20 July.

CLICK ON IMAGES TO ENLARGE

Friedrich Fromm, Friedrich Olbricht, and Albrecht von Quirnheim