19 December 1944

V-MAIL

438^th AAA AW BN

APO 230 % Postmaster, N.Y.

Germany

19 December, 1944       1020

Dearest sweetheart –

Well – I have to resort to this after all, dear – but let’s blame it on the military situation. I’ve really been and still am – quite busy, darling – and glad

No mail yesterday – but quite a number of packages – none for me, this time. Despite everything – we’re planning a regular big Christmas celebration here – and already have a big tree set up here. We found some decorations and lights and the tree is beginning to look real nice.

I wonder how things are at home and what kind of Christmas you’ll have. It’s so long since I’ve had a sort of recent letter from you, dear – I seem to be out of contact with things at home. But I hope you have a pleasant day – and by the way – how about New Year’s Eve, sweetheart? I hope you have something planned. Whatever you do, I’ll be with you in everything but person – dear. All for now, darling. My love to the folks – and

My deepest love and affection –

Greg

* TIDBIT *

about Trenchfoot

Thousands of soldiers in November and December of 1944 were treated for non-battle casualties, the most common being "trench foot," so named in World War I as it was experienced by men in the trenches. This undoubtedly is part of what kept Greg so busy in these wintry days of battle.

The winter of 1944-45 was the coldest and wettest in years, and the wet cold, combined with the tactical situation, created conditions most favorable for the development of trench foot and frostbite. Moreover, two points of view prevailed about the possibility of a winter campaign in Europe, neither of them conducive to preparations for the prevention of cold injury. Historically, decisive military campaigns had not been fought in western Europe during the cold winter months. On the other hand, it was the opinion, at least in certain circles, during the summer and early fall of 1944, that the war would end before winter. Thus, staffs were not psychologically attuned to the need for large supplies of special combat clothing, footgear, and other winterizing equipment, or to the necessity for an extensive program for the prevention and control of cold injury when there was time. A calculated risk also was taken by command decision to bring forward ammunition, gasoline, and other combat requirements to the exclusion of winter clothing and footgear.

What follows has been extracted from The Annals of Surgery, August 1946; Vol. 124, Issue(2), pages: 301–313.

"Trench foot" is a diagnostic term used by the U. S. Army Medical Corps to describe the cold injury resulting from prolonged exposure to just above freezing temperature (340 to 400 F.). It has occurred almost exclusively in combat infantry riflemen who were forced into immobility by enemy action. "Frost-bite" is the term used to describe the cold injury resulting from exposure to below-freezing-temperatures-either "ground type" occurring in the ground forces, or "high altitude type" occurring in combat air crews. "Immersion foot" designates the cold injury resulting from prolonged exposure of the feet to cold water. For administrative reasons, these injuries are described as different clinical entities, but it now appears that they all produce similar pathologic changes and can be treated identically.

Following the early November offensive, and again after the German counter-offensive in December, I944, the U. S. Army casualties increased at an alarming rate, several weeks reaching 50 per cent of battle casualties. During the Lorraine campaign, 20 in November 1944, the 328th Infantry Regiment had to evacuate more than 500 men as casualties from trench foot and exposure during the first 4 days of one engagement; this number exceeded the number of battle casualties.

TOTAL MONTHLY ADMISSIONS TO HOSPITALS ON CONTINENT
(Europe Only)

                                  Battle         Trench Foot and Frost-bite
                                 Injuries                    Injuries                

    Nov. 1944 .........     41,793                      6,869
    Dec. 1944 .........     37,336                     11,469

In trench foot, the sequence of events leading to the injury followed a fairly constant pattern. The combat infantry soldier is forced into immobility in a wet foxhole for a prolonged period of time. During this period, he first notices tingling or complains of a stinging sensation in his feet, which may become quite intense. After a period of exposure, the feet become numb and finally anesthetic, "like blocks of ice." When the attack is ordered, or he is relieved, walking causes severe burning pain; and on the removal of his shoes, the feet become swollen and warm. Three factors were always present in the carefully examined cases. First, wet cold; second, a prolonged exposure in a relatively immobile position; and third, physical activity following the exposure. Of these factors, wet cold is undoubtedly the most important. Peak casualties always followed periods of wet cold weather.

The secondary etiologic factors which combine with wet cold to produce the final injury are important since they are often correctable. Combat activity was always followed by an increase in trench foot casualties. Fifty per cent of the soldiers were injured in their first combat experience. Proper and adequate foot gear was unavailable in 8o per cent of the casualties during the November, I944, offensive. After the U. S. Army overshoe was issued, this foot gear proved inadequate in many instances. The important fact that a boot should be designed for rapid removal is not considered in the standard American and British foot gear. Soldiers repeatedly use this excuse for their failure to replace wet socks under combat conditions.

First and Second Degree Trench Foot
    

Third Degree Trench Foot
2 days, 2 weeks, 4 weeks and 6 weeks after exposure

Constriction of the foot and ankle by improperly fitted shoes was difficult to evaluate. Many soldiers complained that their "shoes felt too small after several days of exposure" but the first sign of cold injury is edema and probably caused this complaint. Prolonged dependency and immobility of the feet appeared important in a few cases occurring in tank crews and artillery squads. These soldiers alone had either dry feet (tank crews) or were in a position to maintain an adequate rotation policy. This suggests that dependency and immobility increase the susceptibility of the feet to cold injury. The soldiers with a history of previous foot trouble, either cold injury or other conditions, sustained milder injuries than the entire group examined. Only 20 per cent suffered second- or third-degree injuries as compared to 63 per cent with similar injuries for the entire group. In other words, previous foot trouble made the soldier "foot conscious" and medical aid was requested early.

The most important correctable secondary factor is an improved rotation policy for troops during combat activity. If a few men are relieved for only an hour daily from each group, adequate foot care could be required under supervision, if necessary. This was almost impossible when the tactical situation required troops to wade streams and "dig in" until relief arrived. Company commanders most successful in avoiding casualties under these circumstances, required each soldier to exchange old wet socks for clean dry ones when daily food rations were issued. This often required the mess sergeant to deliver food and clean socks from foxhole to foxhole during the hours of darkness.

Soldiers reporting into Battalion Aid Stations with "cold feet" should be immediately sent to a nearby "Restoration Area" for at least 24 hours' observation. Experienced clinicians have difficulty in estimating the degree of injury until the reactive hyperemia or inflammatory reaction develops. In the Restoration Area, the most important point in the evacuation chain, all "cold feet" should be given a cold foot bath and placed in a cool dry bed. Warm food and drink should he given to restore normal body temperature and gradual, slow restoration of normal blood flow of the feet. External heat, walking or vigorous massage is avoided at this period. Slow restoration of blood flow will avoid stasis in the capillary bed which subsequently leads to skin necrosis.

Here is an article about trench foot published by TIME magazine, 01 January 1945 titled "Medicine: Again, Trench Foot"

Europe's mud and slush of October and November caught the U.S. Army with its feet unprepared. Result: up to Dec. 12, 17,500 G.I.s had developed trench foot, something no one expected in World War II (partly because no one expected the war to settle down into mud and trenches).

Trench foot is a sort of mild frostbite that results from letting feet stay cold and damp for a long time. Shelter foot and immersion foot (TIME, May 10, 1943) are essentially the same thing. Circulation slows or stops, feet turn white and numb, sudden warming causes painful burning. The devitalized tissues may recover if kept cool and dry for a few days or weeks. But in some cases blisters develop and becomeinfected, even cause gangrene, amputation or death. Many victims who emerge with feet intact can never fight again because their feet ache on long hikes and are very sensitive to cold.

Boots and Massage. In contrast to U.S forces, the British have no trench-foot problem, even though they have been actually wading through Holland. Their stout workmen-type boots and gum boots have turned out to be drier than anything the U.S. has produced. But the most important factor is that British soldiers are required to keep their boots waxed, to massage their feet with oil and change frequently to dry socks.

Most U.S. soldiers have tramped the mud in rubber-soled, rough-side-out leather combat boots (fairly water-repellent if coated in a waxy substance called dubbing); some had only ordinary G.I. boots with legging extensions (an extremely soggy combination); a few had galoshes. Most trench-foot casualties occurred because officers and men were still careless about dubbing and foot massage, and did not bother with dry socks or galoshes.

Already the trench-foot rate has been cut 75% simply by making the G.I.s take care of their feet, even in battle. Men are learning to dry their socks on bushes or in their jackets or helmets. In some forward areas, dry socks are issued along with rations. Now improved boots are on the way. They are the Quartermaster Corps' new calf-high shoe-pacs, synthetic rubber up to normal shoe height and leather the rest of the way, designed to be worn with two pairs of heavy socks. Production began in August and a few shoe-pacs have already been issued to the troops fighting under the worst conditions.

Discipline and Massage. The Germans have not licked the problem (in one group of 46 captured German casualties, 14 had trench foot) but the Russians have—thanks to long experience and rigid discipline. All Russian soldiers are paired off, required to massage each other's feet regularly; and the man whose massage buddy gets trench foot catches hell.

18 December 1944

438^th AAA AW BN

APO 230 % Postmaster, N.Y.

Germany

18 December, 1944       1055

Hello darling!

I started to write you a V-mail and changed my mind. This may be a shortie – but I’d rather write that then a V-mail – if possible. You may gather that I’m pretty busy, dear – and I am. If you can recall the date when you receive this – you’ll know why. But everything is going along well enough and there’s nothing to worry about.

Yesterday didn’t seem like Sunday at all – and honestly – all the individuality that Sunday used to have – is fast disappearing. I can’t explain exactly why – but that’s the way it seems to be.

Again I got no mail from you, but I did get a V-mail from Lawrence – still at Holloran General. He didn’t write his new address so I’m unable to answer him for the time being. And I got a letter from the MD friend of mine in Italy with the 5th Army – and boy did my mouth water. A good many of the MC’s are being reassigned to jobs in the States – but of course those fellows have been overseas for some time now. This fellow – for example – came to England in Nov. '43, then went to Africa and then to Italy, where he’s been for longer than a year. So I guess he deserves a trip home. Boy – how I’d love a little trip home like that! How long would it take us to get married, dear??

Well – I got two more packages yesterday, too. One was from Lawrence – a box of cigars he mailed a long time ago – and they were welcome. I’ve been smoking some German stogies I got the time I got the wine I wrote you about and boy, you have to be real tough to smoke them – which – of course – I am dear! The other package was a real surprise; it was from Mary and Bob Richardson – you remember them in Marblehead? I hadn’t heard from them in a long while.

I haven’t been able to keep up with my correspondence these past few weeks and I have a whole mess of letters to answer – but they’ll just have to wait for awhile. Things will be quiet again. It’s strange – but with everything all mixed up etc – Special Service still tries to function – and it’s a good thing too – because one or two hours relaxation is almost a necessity at times. I heard our officer mention at breakfast that he was trying to get a new picture “Conflict” with Humphrey Bogart – which I understand is very new and had it’s première – here on the front – not so long ago.

Darling – I’ve been writing very swiftly to get this written – so excuse some of the writing – but I really have to stop now and get this sealed. Perhaps tomorrow I’ll be able to write with more concentration. That will depend on a few factors. For the time being, then, so long – sweetheart. My love to the folks – and don’t forget – I’m forever the fellow who loves and wants you for himself alone –

My deepest love – dear

Greg

* TIDBIT *

about The Counteroffensive Surprise
in the Choice of the Ardennes

CLICK TO ENLARGE

The Ardennes, Belgium and Luxembourg

The information that follows was excerpted from The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge, part of the "European Theater of Operations" portion of the U.S. Army in World War II, written by Hugh M. Cole and published by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army in 1965, Chapter IV.

The area through which Hitler chose to launch his counteroffensive was, with the exception of the Vosges, the most difficult terrain on the entire line of the Western Front. It consists of two major parts, the Eifel and the Ardennes. Although the Ardennes has given its name to the Battle, this area should be lumped with that of the Eifel to the east, thickly covered with forests, providing good cover from air observation even in the fall and winter.

Hitler's selection of the Ardennes for launching the western counteroffensive was based mainly on the obvious advantage of attacking the Allies where they were weakest. The cover and deception plan, personally devised by Hitler, turned on a half-truth. A part of the strategic concentration would be made in the Rheydt-Jülich-Cologne area east of Aachen. Here the preparations for the counteroffensive would be paraded before the Allies. The main actor in this play was the Sixth Panzer Army. Ostensibly its headquarters remained northwest of Cologne. Four of the armored divisions assigned to this headquarters also assembled in this area. The intensification of rail and road traffic which began here about mid-November was only partly concealed. Much movement was made in daylight. Radio traffic was increased commensurate with troop concentration. Additional antiaircraft battalions came into the area and with them special allotments of ammunition to produce a thickening of fire which the Allied air forces could not possibly fail to notice.

In contrast to this northern concentration, that in the Eifel was the product of secrecy carried to the limit. The Eifel terrain was well adapted to concealment. Thick forest cover cloaked its slopes, its valleys and plateaus. Small villages, singly not worthy of aerial investigation but in sum capable of harboring large forces, offered excellent dispersal. Camouflage had become second nature with the German soldier in the west-indeed since Normandy the art of camouflage had become the science of survival, and the Eifel made this task relatively easy. Strict traffic regulation confined all rail movements and road marches to hours of darkness. Special security detachments prowled the Eifel, and woe to the commander who allowed a vehicle park to grow beyond normal size. A radio blackout was thrown over the concentration area except for those units actually facing the enemy in the covering positions. No artillery registration was permitted except by guns in the line, and even they were limited to a few rounds per day. Reconnaissance was confined to a handful of higher officers; combat patrolling on the Ardennes front was almost entirely limited to nighttime search for American patrols.

Whatever thought may have been given to the Ardennes, the Allies were on the offensive and preparing for yet greater offensive operations well to the north and the south of the VIII Corps sector. Losses during November had been high and the reserve of new divisions in the United States was running low (in the United Kingdom such a reserve no longer existed). The old military axiom that the line cannot be strong everywhere applied with full force to the Allied positions reaching from Switzerland to the North Sea. Almost automatically Allied strength would concentrate in those areas where the offensive was the order of the day and where decision might be reached. The Ardennes sector seemed no special risk. It offered - or so it seemed - no terrain attraction for the enemy, and there was no recognizable indication that enemy forces opposite the VIII Corps and 99th Infantry Division outnumbered those deployed on the friendly side of the line. If there was a "calculated risk," therefore, it was no more precise or specific than that taken wittingly by any commander who thins his front to mount an attack while knowing that he has over-all superiority and the ability to retain the initiative. It long had been an article of faith in Allied strategy that Germany would make its greatest efforts in defense of what Eisenhower had called the two hearts of Germany: the Ruhr, the industrial heart, and Berlin, the political heart.

The Ardennes had been a quiet sector of the Western Front since the Allied dash across France had halted in September. The German divisions identified here as fairly permanent residents were battle weary, understrength, and obviously in need of rest and refitting. At various times fresh divisions had appeared opposite the VIII Corps, but their stay had been brief. By December it had become axiomatic, insofar as US intelligence was concerned, that any new division identified on the VIII Corps front was no more than a bird of passage en route to the north or the south. As a result the Ardennes assumed a kind of neutral hue in American eyes. Important happenings, it seemed, transpired north of the Ardennes and south of the Ardennes, but never at the division point itself.

Was there any warning note sounded for the VIII Corps and its troops in the line during the days just prior to the German onslaught? With the advantage of hindsight, seven items can be discerned in the corps reports for the period 13-15 December which might have given the alarm. Two divisions, the 28th and 106th, sent in reports of increased vehicular activity on the nights before the attack. The 28th discounted its own report by noting that this was the normal accompaniment of an enemy front-line relief and that the same thing had happened when a German unit had pulled out three weeks before. The 106th was a green division and unlikely to know what weight could be attached legitimately to such activity. In fact one regimental commander rebuked his S-2 for reporting this noise as "enemy movement." A third incident occurred on 14 December when a woman escapee reported to the 28th Infantry Division commander that the woods near Bitburg were jammed with German equipment. Her answers to questions posed by the division G-2 apparently were impressive enough to gain the attention of the VIII Corps G-2 who ordered that she be taken to the First Army headquarters.

The woman arrived there on 16 December.

The four remaining incidents attach to the capture of German prisoners on 15 December, two each by the 4th and 106th Infantry Divisions. The time of capture is important: two at 1830, one at 1930, and one at an unspecified time thereafter. All four claimed that fresh troops were arriving in the line, that a big attack was in the offing, that it might come on the 16th or 17th but certainly would be made before Christmas. Two of the prisoners were deserters; they themselves did not take the reported attack too seriously since, as they told their captors, all this had been promised German troops before. The other two were wounded. One seems to have made some impression on the interrogators, but since he was under the influence of morphine his captors decided that further questioning would be necessary.

Of the seven incidents which in retrospect may be considered signposts pointing to an impending attack on the VIII Corps front, only four were reported to the corps headquarters. Three of the four prisoners seemed to be parroting wild and baseless rumors of a sort which was fairly common, and these three were bundled into prisoner of war cages without further ado. The incidents reported to the VIII Corps were forwarded to the First Army and duly noted by that headquarters on 14 and 15 December. Only one incident was deemed worthy of 12th Army Group attention. This, one of the reports of extraordinary traffic, was mentioned in the commanding general's briefing as confirmation of the predicted relief of the 326th Infantry Division.

This briefing began at 0915 on 16 December.

What of air intelligence, the source of Rundstedt's greatest worry? Bad weather during the first half of December did reduce the number of Allied reconnaissance sorties flown east of the First Army front but by no means produced the kind of blackout for which the enemy hoped. In the month prior to the Ardennes attack the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Group, supporting the First Army, flew 361 missions of which 242 were judged successful. From the 10th through the 15th of December the group flew 71 missions with varying degrees of success; for example, on 14 December planes flown over Trier by the 30th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron reported the weather clear, but two hours later a second mission ran into haze and was able to see very little. Only one day, 13 December, in the five critical days before the attack found all US air reconnaissance grounded.

The pilots belonging to the 67th Group and the 10th Photo Reconnaissance Group, the latter attached to the Third Army's old partner, the XIX TAC, actually constructed an imposing picture of German buildup west of the Rhine in the month preceding the Ardennes counteroffensive. In the last week of November the number of enemy columns on the roads showed a marked increase. On 30 November US reconnaissance planes reported a drastic heightening of rail activity west of the Rhine and this was confirmed by the fighter-bombers flying "armed-recce." Special indications of forthcoming attack were numerous: a large number of hospital trains on the west bank of the Rhine, several groups of flatcars carrying Tiger tanks, and fifty searchlights in one location. Lights representing large-scale night movements were consistently reported, although the two available night fighter squadrons were so badly understrength (averaging no more than ten P-61's operational) that their contribution perforce was limited.

On 15 December the Allied air commanders' conference at SHAEF convened to review the big picture. Here the SHAEF G-3 told the assembled airmen that the Roer dam operations had failed to provoke a move by the main enemy armored reserve; as for the VIII Corps front, "nothing to report." Then the A-2 rose to sketch the activities of the Luftwaffe: it had continued the movement westward, closer to the battlefield, which had been noted in recent days, but all this was "defensive" only. The prelude to the Ardennes counteroffensive of 16 December can only be reckoned as a gross failure by Allied ground and air intelligence. One of the greatest skills in the practice of the military art is the avoidance of the natural tendency to overrate or underestimate the enemy. Here, the enemy capability for reacting other than to direct Allied pressure had been sadly underestimated. Americans and British had looked in a mirror for the enemy and seen there only the reflection of their own intentions.

17 December 1944

438^th AAA AW BN

APO 230 % Postmaster, N.Y.

Germany

17 December, 1944        1230

Wilma, darling –

I’m kind of tired today – not having had too much sleep last nite. It was exciting for awhile – but today everything seems to be going along well enough. Yesterday I was too busy to get out to visit A Battery – although in the evening I was able to relax. We had a movie – “Jamie” – and although I hadn’t heard about it at all – it turned out to be very enjoyable entertainment. I think I forgot to mention to you that I saw “Our Hearts Were Young and Gay” – with Gail Russell – some time during the past week. Is that the Russell that had so much written about her? Yes or no – I thought the picture very mediocre – and except for a few laughs – it dragged considerably.

I got one more old letter of yours yesterday, dear – but welcome nonetheless; I also received a Christmas card from Barbara Tucker Ensign – mailed from Salem. I don’t know what she was doing there – there was no note of explanation. And I got my third annual Christmas gift from the Salem Hospital Medical Staff – a leather bound, pocket-sized address book. It’s rather neat but I don’t need it here. I’ll send it along to you, darling, to hold – or to use, for that matter. I’ve already jotted them a note of thanks – and defied them to think of something different for next Christmas. Now! Now!

The letter I received from you yesterday was dated 11 November and you mentioned the fact that you didn’t want to remind me of things too often lest I think you’re preaching. Hell – I never feel that way about anything you write, sweetheart. I always appreciate the content and the reason for writing what you do – and why should I consider that preaching? And if I’ve ever written that I didn’t want you to write ‘blue’ letters, I didn’t mean it that way, darling. Certainly I want to know your every mood – just as you do mine. Among other things, that’s one more way in which we’re able to reveal ourselves to each other – because when a person is ‘blue’ or lonesome – he’s just a little bit more easy to know – and darling I want to know as much about you as possible while we’re apart. Regardless of all that – we’ll get married as soon as it’s humanly possible after I return home. Right?

I liked reading your ideas on bringing up children. I’ve never exactly crystallized in my own mind just how that should be done – but I do feel there’s a wrong and a right way. Each of us benefits or loses as a result of his own situation. I feel that being an only child, dear, you missed out on a great deal – but you probably gained in other respects. The point is, sweetheart, that it’s going to be fun – bringing up our very own – someday and trying to do a good job in it.

This p.m. I’m going to make another attempt at visiting Able Battery – this being my 3rd day supposedly. I may not be able to make it however. Tonite should be quiet, I hope, and maybe we’ll play some Bridge. So I’ll stop now, sweetheart. Remember – no matter what I say or how I say it – I love you always, darling, and as strongly as I know how. My love to the folks, best regards to Mary – and

All my deepest love to you

Greg

* TIDBIT *

about The Malmédy Massacre

CLICK TO ENLARGE PICTURES

17 December 1994 Photo of the Massacre Site
50 years later...
(photo by Gregory A. Walden as found on a previous website)

Most of this version of the Malmédy Massacre was found on the History Learning Site. Additional information came from The History Place's web site as well as Wikipedia.

On 17 December 1944, men from Battery B of the 285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion were ordered to move from Schevenhutte, near Aachen, to St Vith in the Ardennes. Their route took them near the town of Malmédy. On their journey, on the N-23 St Vith road that passed to the east of Malmédy, Battery B met up with Lieutenant-Colonel David Pergrin of the 291st Engineer Combat Battalion. Pergrin had heard that the Germans were along the route which the men from Battery B were taking. He advised them to take a different route to St Vith. However, the officers in charge of the battery decided that they had their orders and, ignoring Pergrin's advice, continued along their designated route.

This journey took them to what the locals called the 'Baugnez Crossroads' - two miles south-east of Malmédy. In fact, there were five roads there and to the Americans it was known as 'Five Points'. A military policeman - and previously placed route markers - directed the convoy along its way. About half-a-mile from the 'Baugnez Crossroads', the first vehicles in the convoy were fired on by two tanks from the 1st SS Panzer Division led by Joachim Peiper. This unit was one of just two units in the whole Nazi military allowed to use Hitler's name in its title - the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler. This unit had a fearsome reputation and Peiper was known as a man who would let nothing stand in his way of success - including the taking of prisoners. In the Russian campaign, Peiper's unit was known as the 'Blowtorch Brigade' for its violence towards civilians.

Joachim Peiper
with SS "Death's Head" Symbol on Cap

On this day in particular, it is said that Peiper was in a particularly foul mood as his advance had not been as successful or as swift as he had hoped. Though the 1st SS Division had suffered few casualties in terms of manpower, it had lost tanks and half-tracks in its advance as the US 99th Infantry Division had put up a far stronger resistance than Peiper had bargained for. The two tanks that fired on B Battery were under the command of SS Lieutenant Werner Sternebeck. He had lost five of his seven tanks in the advance. Peiper, it seems, was furious at yet more delays to his advance.

Clearly outgunned by the Germans, the men from B Battery surrendered after Sternebeck's attack. Peiper himself went to the Baugnez Crossroads and brusquely ordered Sternebeck to move on. The 113 American prisoners-of-war who had survived the attack were assembled in a field near the Café Bodarwé at the crossroads - this figure included eight Americans who had already been captured by Peiper. A young Belgium boy witnessed what happened next.

At about 1415, soldiers from the 1st SS Panzer Division opened fire on the 113 men who were in the field. The firing stopped at about 1430. Survivors were killed by a pistol shot to the head, in some cases by English speaking SS who walked among the victims asking if anyone was injured or needed help. Those who responded were shot. Some were clubbed them to death as later autopsies showed. Incredibly, some prisoners did get away after feigning death. It was three of these escapees that came across Pergrin.

Colonel Pergrin had heard the attack by Sternebeck and went to investigate, first in a jeep and then on foot. Near Five Points, three Americans rushed up to Pergrin. It was these men who first alerted the Americans that something had gone on at the crossroads. Pergrin took the wounded men to Malmédy and at 1640 contacted the First Army's headquarters to inform them that some sort of massacre had taken place at Five Points. The same day, 21 survivors of the massacre made statements to the American authorities in Malmédy. Their accounts were remarkably similar despite the fact that they had had little time to discuss their experiences.

Because of the nature of the Battle of the Bulge, no one side could claim the land that the dead men lay in. It was not until 14 January 1945 that the Americans could lay claim to the area around the crossroads and recover the bodies. 71 snow-covered bodies were recovered. The freezing weather had done a lot to preserve the bodies and that made the autopsies easier, especially as some had been covered in snow.

CLICK TO ENLARGE

When the massacre took place, Peiper had left the area around Five Points and had moved on. He was not at the scene when the shooting started. However, on 12 December, it is said that Hitler had issued an order which stated that no prisoners were to be taken and that a "wave of terror" was to descend on the Allies who stood in the way of the offensive. However, in the trial at Dachau no written evidence was produced to substantiate this and, as evidence, the court ignored it. Also Peiper's men had taken prisoners in their advance prior to the Malmédy incident. So what happened?

The sheer number of prisoners almost certainly sealed the fate of the Americans. Over 100 prisoners could not be left where they were - in the field. But there was no spare capacity for the Germans to guard them as Peiper had ordered the SS units under his command to speed up their advance. They could not be sent marching back towards the German lines as Peiper only had control of one main road and his unit was using it. Any men marching in the opposite direction could easily clog up the road. Peiper's other worry was that he might be attacked by American units known to be in the area.

Two theories have been put forward to explain what happened.

The men were deliberately murdered in cold blood. Certainly, the 1st SS Panzer Division had been responsible for atrocities in Russia and they had already shot captured Americans in their advance in the Ardennes Offensive - and more were shot after Malmédy. It is possible that Major Werner Poetschke, who commanded the 1st SS Panzer Battalion, gave the order - but no evidence has proved this, just rumor.

Another theory put forward is that some Americans tried to escape and were fired on by the Germans. Other Germans heard the firing, but were not aware that the targets were three Americans as opposed to all of the group. Either trigger-happy or simply battle-hardened, they opened fire on the group as a whole. In October 1945, an American soldier made a sworn testimony that he had escaped with two other men (who were killed) but he had survived and made it back to US lines. The law as it stood then would have allowed the Germans to shoot at escaping prisoners - but not at the whole group. It is possible that their escape precipitated the shooting of the other men.

In May 1946, Peiper and 70 of his men were put on trial. The charge stated "That they willfully, deliberately and wrongfully permit, encourage, aid, abet and participate in the killing, shooting, ill treatment, abuse and torture of members of the armed forces of the United States of America." Controversy soon arose. The defense team raised allegations of mistreatment including physical abuse by the U.S. Army and cited the use of mock trials in obtaining SS confessions as improper. The defense also complained that the court's legal expert, a Jew, constantly ruled in favor of the prosecution.

One of those who were charged was 18-year-old Arvid Freimuth who committed suicide in his cell before the trial started. Forty-three of those accused were sentenced to death and the rest received prison sentences. Controversy continued, however, as various U.S. Army Boards conducted critical reviews of the trial process and methods used during pretrial interrogations. As a result, most of the death sentences were commuted and over half of the life sentences were reduced. In 1949, following a series of public charges and counter charges by trial participants and further investigations over whether justice had been served in the conduct of the trial, six of the remaining death sentences were commuted. By the early 1950s, following years of accusations, denials, investigations, controversy, and political turmoil, the final remaining death sentences were commuted and release of all of the convicted SS men began.

In December of 1956, the last prisoner, Peiper, was released. Peiper lived in France following his release from jail. In 1974 he was identified by a former Communist resistance member of the region who issued a report for the French Communist Party. In 1976 a Communist historian, investigating the STASI archives, found the Peiper file. On 21 June tracts denouncing his presence were distributed in Traves. A day later, an article in the Communist publication L'Humanité revealed Peiper's presence in Traves and he became the subject of death threats.

Upon the death threats Peiper sent his family back to Germany. He himself stayed in Traves. In 1976, During the night from 13 July to 14 July, Bastille day in France, a gunfight took place at Peiper's house, in which Peiper himself shot several times. His house was set on fire. Peiper's charred corpse was later found in the ruins with a bullet in the chest. The perpetrators were never identified, but were suspected to be former French Resistance members or Communists.

16 December 1944

438^th AAA AW BN

APO 230 % Postmaster, N.Y.

Germany

16 December, 1944      1030

My dearest sweetheart –

Sick call seems to be just about over right now, dear, so here I go again. I don’t know whether I mentioned it or not yesterday – but I’m visiting A Battery these days – but only afternoons – instead of staying with them for 3 days. I had to give that up because there’s too much work around here; the dental and administrative officers go out to stay, though.

I was out all of yesterday p.m. and the fresh air was swell. It was a rather clear day and it looks as if it will be the same today. If it doesn’t rain today – it will make 3 days – and that will be a new record. In the evening I was rather tired – but we played some Bridge just the same. And that reminds me of something I wanted to find out. You play enough Bridge to be able to answer it, darling. When we started playing a few months ago – the only score card we had was one dated 1935. According to that – doubled, not vulnerable – is 100 for the first trick down, and 200 for subsequent tricks; vulnerable is 100 for each trick set, and doubled vulnerable – 200 first trick, and 300 for subsequent tricks. Now the problem arose when one of the officers got a package the other day and among the items were playing cards and a scorecard – etched by Milton C. Wool – but with no date on it. According to this – doubled not vulnerable – is 100, 100, 200, 200, etc; vulnerable – not doubled – 200, 200, 400 etc, and doubled, vulnerable 200, 400, 400 etc. What we’d like to know, dear, is what is the latest along the lines of scoring.

And while I’m on the subject of Bridge – maybe you can get this one – a problem someone presented to us:

Dummy

Ace diamonds      Q clubs       Ace spades

8

9

    3 hearts                                                                                                             5 hearts
    3 spades                                                                                                            Q, 10 diamonds
    5,4,3, diamonds                                                                                              K, J clubs

6
2 spades       J diamonds       Q hearts
K

The lead is in South’s hand, hearts is trump and you have to make 4 out of the 5 tricks. The solution does not depend on what card West or East plays or discards. You’ll probably find this easy, dear – but we had to sweat it out.

In reading an old letter of yours, sweetheart, you tell me you hope we’ll be happy even after we’re married 20, 30 or 40 years. Darling – if I didn’t think we would be all the years of our married life together – I wouldn’t want to marry you. I don’t need a wife just for the sake of having one. I want to marry someone whom I can make happy, someone on whom I can concentrate my attention and affections for the rest of our lives. I became engaged to you – with your consent, dear – because I felt you were that someone – and I know I’m not wrong. We can’t miss. We know what we want, Sweetheart – and we’ll find it, too.

It’s time to go (11:50). I was interrupted a couple of times – as usual. Be with you in writing tomorrow, dear – but in Spirit – I’m still with you – sealed envelope or no. My love to the folks – and to you

My everlasting love and affection –

Greg

* TIDBIT *

about "The Battle of the Bulge" Begins

One of the most storied battles in U.S. Army history, began on this day at dawn, 16 December 1944. The information that follows was excerpted from The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge, part of the "European Theater of Operations" portion of the U.S. Army in World War II, written by Hugh M. Cole and published by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army in 1965:

The plan for the Ardennes counteroffensive was born in the mind and will of Hitler. Such was the military, political, economic, and moral position of the Third Reich in the autumn of 1944 that a leader who lacked all of the facts and who by nature clung to a mystic confidence in his star might rationally conclude that defeat could be postponed and perhaps even avoided by some decisive stroke. To this configuration of circumstances must be added Hitler's implicit faith in his own military genius, a faith to all appearance unshaken by defeat and treason, a faith that accepted the possibility, even the probability, that the course of conflict might be reversed by a military stroke of genius.

As early as 1939 Hitler had gone on record as to the absolute necessity of protecting the Ruhr industrial area, the heart of the entire war-making machine. Even after the disastrous impact of the 1944 Soviet summer offensive he clung to the belief that the Ruhr factories were more important to Germany than the loss of territory in the east. Politically, if Hitler hoped to lead from strength and parlay a military victory into a diplomatic coup, the monolithic USSR was a less susceptible object than the coalition of powers in the west. August was a nightmare for the German divisions in the west and for the German field commanders. Shattered into bits and pieces by the weight of Allied guns and armor, hunted and hounded along the roads by the unopposed Allied air forces, captured and killed in droves, the German forces in France were thoroughly beaten. All requests for permission to withdraw to more defensible positions were rejected in peremptory fashion by Hitler's headquarters, with the cold rejoinder "stand and hold" or "fight to the last man." In most cases these orders were read on the run by the retreating divisions.

The major reasons for Hitler's selection of the Ardennes were:

• The enemy front in the Ardennes sector was very thinly manned.


• A blow here would strike the seam between the British and Americans and lead to political as well as military disharmony between the Allies. Furthermore an entrance along this seam would isolate the British 21 Army Group and allow the encirclement and destruction of the British and Canadians before the American leadership (particularly the political leadership) could react.


• The distance from the jump-off line to a solid strategic objective (Antwerp) was not too great and could be covered quickly, even in bad weather.


• The configuration of the Ardennes area was such that the ground for maneuver was limited and so would require the use of relatively few divisions.


• The terrain to the east of the breakthrough sector selected was very heavily wooded and offered cover against Allied air observation and attack during the build-up for the assault.An attack to regain the initiative in this particular area would erase the enemy ground threat to the Ruhr.

And so it began, on 16 December 1944, as summarized in the entry for this date in Normandy to Victory: The War Diary of General Courtney H. Hodges & the First U.S. Army, maintained by his aides Major William C. Sylvan and Captain Francis G. Smith Jr.; edited by John T. Greenwood, copyright 2008 by the Association of the United States Army, pp.213-215.

CLICK TO ENLARGE

This newsreel posted by PopularMilitary.com about the
Battle of the Bulge, includes German footage from captured soldiers.

15 December 1944

438^th AAA AW BN

APO 230 % Postmaster, N.Y.

Germany

15 December, 1944      1010

Good morning Wilma, darling!

Half the month of December gone – and it’s hard to believe. Where these days go to, I don’t know – but I’m glad they go. Each – is one less to sweat out. Say – before I go any further – you asked me in one of my letters whether I was scared. Now I know I’ve mentioned that word a few times here and there since landing on the Continent – but darling – I don’t want you to start thinking your fiancé is a coward. I’ve been scared – but on occasion only – and anyone who has been here has been the same – from time to time, and if he doesn’t admit it, he’s a g-d’d liar. But it hasn’t affected me in any way at all darling and I’m just as normal as anyone else. It’s just that if you happen to be in a house – and the shells start whistling over – you can’t help being scared; and you go out and stand behind a brick wall, trying to figure out from which direction the shells are coming; and then a few crash not too far from you and the shrapnel flies – and you duck – all that is a tense half-hour or so. And 5 minutes afterwards – you’ve forgotten all about it. As a matter of fact – and this seems to be popular consensus – it’s the whistling of the shell which most of us hate. Now I’m not writing this to worry you, dear, but just to explain how a person can be scared. There are other ways too. Please don’t repeat any of this to your folks or mine.

In my letter written yesterday to you, dear, I became so engrossed in answering some questions that I forgot to tell you about opening and enjoying the package you sent me. It was swell and everything came in good condition – especially the Brownies. You can tell Marjorie Mills – or whomever it was – that she’s all wet about Brownies and nuts. There were no worms, dear. If there were – we all ate them as is – anyway. And I can use the Tobacco, too. For awhile – we were getting enough – but recently, with the problem of supply turning up – we haven’t been getting anywhere near as much as before. The candy bars were unspoiled also – although cracked – of course. And I found the flower – and thank Mary for it. And thank you again, sweetheart – for sending it.

I got two old letters from you yesterday, 8 and 9 November – and there’s still a whole pile outstanding. It was interesting reading your reactions concerning the election results. We missed the campaigning over here – but from what we gather – it was a hum-ding of a contest.

One of the two letters mentioned Nancy and her state of unhappiness. As you know, dear, I never did know Nancy and Abbot too well – but it had been intimated to me that family affairs weren’t too satisfactory there. But what good a psychiatrist will do her – I fail to see. She knows her problem, the irritant factor behind it etc. A psychiatrist will not try to adjust her to it; she’s had enough time for that and has failed. If anyone needs a visit to the psychiatrist – Abbot seems to be the one. Well – I hope she settles it – because she certainly sounds unhappy.

But it’s you I’m more interested in, sweetheart, and your state of happiness. You seem concerned about mine – and in reality – there’s no cause for worry on that score at all – honestly. The fact is – that inherently – I’m a happy sort of fellow – and it takes a lot to make me otherwise. But if I’m unhappy at all – it’s only a temporary reaction and I’m able to snap out of it. I need only to think of you sweetheart and what’s in store for the both of us when I get back – and I’m able to snap out of any doldrums. So – don’t you worry at all, dear; I’m O.K. Just you take care of yourself and sit tight!

By the way – the Battalion was able to print up only a few of these Christmas Cards. I got only two – I’m sending one to you and probably one to my folks.

CLICK TO ENLARGE

438th AAA AW BN (M) Headquarters and HQ Battery
Christmas Card - 1944

For now – I’ll have to say ‘so long’ again, darling – but only until I write again. Take care, dear - and love to the folks.

My deepest and warmest love

Greg

* TIDBIT *

about Glenn Miller

Click to play while you read the rest

Most of this biography was extracted from Wikipedia's page about Glenn Miller.

Alton "Glenn" Miller, born on a farm in Las Vegas, California, on 1 March 1904, was an American jazz musician (trombone), arranger, composer, and bandleader in the Swing era. He was one of the best-selling recording artists from 1939 to 1943, leading one of the best known "Big Bands". Miller's notable recordings include "In the Mood", "Moonlight Serenade", "Pennsylvania 6-5000", "Chattanooga Choo Choo", "A String of Pearls", "At Last", "(I've Got a Gal In) Kalamazoo", "American Patrol", "Tuxedo Junction", and "Little Brown Jug".

Miller bought his first trombone at the age of 14 and played in his town orchestra in Missouri. By the time Miller graduated from high school in 1921, he had decided he wanted to become a professional musician. He dropped out of college and became a student of Joseph Schillinger. Under his tutelage he composed what became his signature theme, "Moonlight Serenade".

During the late 1920s and early 1930s, Miller managed to earn a living working as a freelance trombonist in several bands. On a March 21, 1928 Victor Records recording session Miller played alongside Tommy Dorsey, Benny Goodman, and Joe Venuti in the All-Star Orchestra, directed by Nat Shilkret. On November 14, 1929, an original vocalist named Red McKenzie hired Glenn to play on two records that are now considered to be jazz classics: "Hello, Lola" and "If I Could Be With You One Hour Tonight". Beside Glenn were clarinetist Pee Wee Russell, guitarist Eddie Condon, drummer Gene Krupa and Coleman Hawkins on tenor saxophone. In 1935, he assembled an American orchestra for British bandleader Ray Noble, developing the arrangement of lead clarinet over four saxophones that eventually became the sonic keynote of his own big band.

Glenn Miller made his first movie appearance in the 1935 Paramount Pictures release The Big Broadcast of 1936 as a member of the Ray Noble Orchestra performing "Why Stars Come Out at Night". The Big Broadcast of 1936 starred Bing Crosby, George Burns, Gracie Allen, Ethel Merman, Jack Oakie, and Bill "Bojangles" Robinson and also featured performances by Dorothy Dandridge and the Nicholas Brothers, who would appear with Miller again in two movies for Twentieth Century Fox in 1941 and 1942.

Glenn Miller compiled several musical arrangements and formed his first band in 1937. The band failed to distinguish itself from the many others of the era, and eventually broke up. Discouraged, Miller returned to New York. He realized that he needed to develop a unique sound, and decided to make the clarinet play a melodic line with a tenor saxophone holding the same note, while three other saxophones harmonized within a single octave. In September 1938, the Miller band began making recordings for the RCA Victor, Bluebird Records subsidiary. Si Shribman, a prominent East Coast businessman, began financing the band, providing a much needed infusion of cash. In 1939, TIME magazine noted: "Of the 12 to 24 discs in each of today's 300,000 U.S. jukeboxes, from two to six are usually Glenn Miller's." Miller's huge success in 1939 culminated with his band appearing at Carnegie Hall on October 6, with Paul Whiteman, Benny Goodman, and Fred Waring also the main attractions. Louis Armstrong thought enough of Miller to carry around his recordings transferred to seven-inch tape reels when he went on tour.

In 1942, at the peak of his civilian career, Miller decided to join the war effort. At 38, Miller was too old to be drafted, and first volunteered for the Navy but was told that they did not need his services. Miller then wrote to Army Brigadier General Charles Young. He persuaded the United States Army to accept him so he could, in his own words, "be placed in charge of a modernized Army band." After being accepted into the Army, Glenn’s civilian band played its last concert in Passaic, New Jersey, on 27 September 1942. At first placed in the United States Army, Glenn Miller was transferred to the Army Air Force. Miller initially formed a large marching band that was to be the core of a network of service orchestras, but his attempts at modernizing military music were met with some resistance from tradition-minded career officers.

Glenn Miller

Miller's weekly radio broadcast "I Sustain the Wings", for which he co-wrote the eponymous theme song, moved from New Haven to New York City and was very popular. This led to permission for Miller to form his 50-piece Army Air Force Band and take it to England in the summer of 1944, where he gave 800 performances. In summarizing Miller's military career, General Jimmy Doolittle said, “next to a letter from home, that organization was the greatest morale builder in the European Theater of Operations.”

On 15 December 1944, Miller was to fly from the United Kingdom to Paris, France, to play for the soldiers there. His band had flown to France some days before him. His plane (a single-engined UC-64 Norseman, USAAF serial 44-70285) departed from RAF Twinwood Farm in Clapham, Bedfordshire and disappeared while flying over the English Channel. No trace of the aircrew, passengers or plane has ever been found. Miller's status is missing in action. There are three main theories about what happened to Miller's plane. The official report was that the Norseman aircraft had crashed into the channel due to either iced-over wings or engine failure; however, this explanation would prove unsatisfactory for the majority of the populace, thus causing multiple theories and speculations to mushroom over the years.

A second (and most outrageous) theory suggested that Miller made it to France, where he met his untimely death. A book, The Glenn Miller Conspiracy, by Lt. Col. Hunton Downs, a former member of Dwight D. Eisenhower's personal staff, argues that the U.S. government covered up Miller's death. Downs claims that Miller was sent on a secret mission to Germany in December 1944 to persuade anti-Hitler generals to alert the Allies of troop movements. These generals would prevent their own troops from participating in these movements and be spared by the Allies. But Hitler found about Miller's visit. The Nazis tortured Miller, leading to his death.

A third (and most likely) theory suggested that he might have been hit by Royal Air Force bombs after an abortive raid on Siegen, Germany. One hundred and thirty-eight Lancaster bombers, short on fuel, jettisoned approximately 100,000 incendiaries in a designated area before landing. The logbooks of Royal Air Force navigator Fred Shaw recorded that he saw a small, single-engined monoplane spiraling out of control and crashing into the water. Further research by British scholars also seems to indicate that this is the most likely probability, making Miller's death a "friendly fire" incident.

14 December 1944

438^th AAA AW BN

APO 230 % Postmaster, N.Y.

Germany

14 December, 1944        1025

My dearest girl –

I wish it could be empty and quiet here just once in a while – right now, for example, so that I could sit down and write a coherent thoughtful letter. I’m particularly anxious to have that because I’d like to answer your letter of 29 November, dear, when – so to speak – you fired at point blank range. I got your letter yesterday and was anxious to answer immediately – and I was unable to write at all – either to you or my folks. That was the first day missed in a long while. The Colonel and I left for a little trip on business – and we were gone the whole day.

When I first read your letter, I was a little bit peeved – I must admit. For one thing, darling, it’s not fair to read one batch of letters and then another from a different period, compare the two – and find one batch wanting. For instance – if I did that with your letters – I could find that sometimes you have time to concentrate and you really write a swell letter – and then other times – you’re visiting a good deal, going to a movie, playing Bridge – etc – and your letters are a bit more hurried. As a group – that would be noticeable. Individually, I love each and every one of them – they’re from you – and to me; they’re personal; you write to me as you do to no one else – and I’m aware of all that and love you for it.

So far, dear, what I’ve said of your letters – is probably true of mine – except that – when my letters are hasty, show some lack of concentration etc – it’s more often for a different reason.

Now – another point – you mention Lawrence having heard some details that he wouldn’t tell my folks and you act hurt because you thought surely I’d tell you. If I haven’t told you all, darling, it’s because I love you – just as I haven’t told my folks all. I never told Lawrence – until he went into Active service. It makes no difference at all how close we are; I can’t see any sense in telling you the gruesome side of this war that I have seen – and I don’t think you should feel that because we are so close – you should hear it from me. It’s different telling it – and then only some of it – to Lawrence. You must understand the difference, dear.

Now, sweetheart, you tell me you don’t doubt for a minute that I love you. I’m glad for that because if there’s one thing I want you always to be certain of – it’s that. So it boils down to my manner of expression – and how it has changed. I don’t have to go for a walk, darling, to clear my mind – and besides – this isn’t quite the country in which to go strolling with your mind in deep thought; the fact is plain and simple to me – dear – I love you – much much more than when I first left the States. I know so much more about you, your likes, dislikes and mannerisms; we’ve talked about our future together, we’ve made sort of tentative plans about what we might do immediately after our marriage – in short – sweetheart – we’ve been as intimate with each other as two people in love can be who must be an ocean apart. My enthusiasm changed? Hardly, dear – as you will surely see when I get back. Then what? – that’s what you want to know. I don’t want to look for excuses – for the fact is – darling, I have not realized that my letters were fundamentally different – although perhaps I should have. But darling – can’t you realize where I’ve been since June and where I am now? Take a look at that 7th Corps Christmas Card I sent you and realize how much in the war we’ve been and still are. Think of what my moods have been when I’ve sat down to write you; think of the casualties I’ve cared for – writing you a paragraph, stopping for two hours, and continuing; think of some letters which took me all day to write – even though I didn’t so indicate – and then wonder how I ever get a letter off to you at all sometimes – and I didn’t miss many days in six months – no more than you did when you had a busy week-end perhaps. No –dear – I haven’t changed one bit – in my love for you, in my enthusiasm, in my plans for the future together with you, in my potential wit – which you refer to; in anything – darling. But what you haven’t entirely grasped is the fact that my environment has changed – and there isn’t anyone over here who hasn’t been affected by it. It’s temporary though, sweetheart and we’ll break out of it – but please try to understand. Take my individual letter per se – and don’t line it up against one written when I was living in comparative luxury – when the war was still something I personally hadn’t seen. Bear with me, dear – I haven’t slipped –

I’ll stop now, sweetheart. I’ll re-read this to see just what I’ve written. Whatever I’ve said, I know you’ll take it in the correct spirit – because you must know what I’m trying to say. Eventually this will all pass by and we’ll have each other and then letters will be a thing of the past. I think you’ll find my love – true, warm and real.

For now – so long, dearest. I hope I answered what you wanted to know. If not – say so – and I’ll try again. My love to the folks.

All my sincerest and deepest love,

Greg.

* TIDBIT *

about The Roer River Dams
(continued)

CLICK TO ENLARGE

The information that follows was extracted from The Siegfried Line Campaign written by Charles B. MacDonald for the U.S. Army's Center for Military History (1990), Chapter XXVI, Page 606. Go to that site to see footnotes and attributions.

As the 78th Division was attacking through the Monschau Corridor to the north, then northeast along the Strauch-Schmidt highway through extremities of the Huertgen Forest and finally through Schmidt to reach the Roer River dams from the north, the 2nd Division was to attack northward into the Monschau Forest from twin Belgian border villages of Krinkelt-Rocherath, southeast of Camp d'Elsenborn. The 2nd Division was to break a West Wall strongpoint at a road junction marked by a customshouse and a forester's lodge named Wahlerscheid, and then fan out in two directions, northwest to clear resistance opposite the Hoefen-Alzen ridge between the Wahlerscheid road junction and Monschau, and northeast along a higher ridge line, the Dreiborn ridge, which leads to the Roer River Dams. Perhaps in cognizance of the tribulations exposed flanks had wrought in the Huertgen Forest, General Gerow directed that a regiment of the 99th Division make a limited objective attack within the Monschau Forest alongside the 2d Division's exposed right flank.

Aiming first at the Wahlerscheid road junction, the West Wall strongpoint deep within the forest at the meeting point of the Hoefen-Alzen and Dreiborn ridges, the 2nd Division had but one road leading to the first objective. This was a secondary highway running north through the forest into Germany from the twin Belgian villages of Krinkelt-Rocherath. Faced with this restriction, the division commander, General Robertson, had little choice of formation for the first leg of the attack other than regiments in column. He directed the 9th Infantry (Col. Chester J. Hirschfelder) to attack astride the road, take the Wahlerscheid road junction, then swing northwest to clear those Germans opposite the Hoefen-Alzen ridge. Following in column as far as Wahlerscheid, the 38th Infantry (Col. Francis H. Boos) was to be committed northeast from the road junction along the Dreiborn ridge in the direction of the Roer River Dams. The 23d Infantry in division reserve was to remain near Camp d'Elsenborn.

That part of the Monschau Forest through which the 9th Infantry first was to push was a kind of no man's land of snow-covered firs, hostile patrols, mines, and roadblocks. Though the sector belonged within the 99th Division's defensive responsibilities, that division held such an elongated front that defense of some parts had been left more to patrols than to fixed positions. Not for several miles on either side of the forest-cloaked road to Wahlerscheid were there any friendly positions in strength. The gap on the right of the road was of particular concern because the southeastward curve of the 99th Division's line left the sector open to enemy penetration from the east. Approaching along forest trails, the Germans might sever the 2nd Division's lifeline, the lone highway to Wahlerscheid.

2nd Division moves through the Monschau Forest
December 1944

Because the forested no man's land between Krinkelt-Rocherath and Wahlerscheid was some three miles deep, obtaining accurate intelligence information before the attack was difficult. About all the 2nd Division knew was that the strongpoint at Wahlerscheid was held by troops of the 277th Volks Grenadier Division's 991st Regiment. Any real estimate of enemy strength at Wahlerscheid or any pinpoint locations of German pillboxes and other positions were missing. This situation made it particularly difficult to plan artillery fires in support of the attack.

The Monschau Forest was almost uncannily silent as troops of the 9th Infantry moved forward on foot in approach march formation an hour after daylight on 13 December. Because the highway was known to be mined, the men had to plow through underbrush and snow drifts on either side. When a partial thaw set in, branches of fir trees heavy with snow dumped their wet loads upon the men beneath them. In some ravines the ground was so marshy that icy water oozed over the tops of the men's overshoes. So impressed had been their commanders with the misfortunes of the 28th Division when depending upon but one supply road at Schmidt that they had ordered the men to carry enough rations, ammunition, and antitank mines to last for at least twenty-four hours without resupply.

At 1240 the column neared the clearing about the Wahlerscheid road junction. "Both battalions have dropped packs," Colonel Hirschfelder reported; "contact imminent." The 9th Infantry faced a formidable position that in some respects possessed the strength of a small fortress. Grouped compactly about the road junction and sited to provide interlocking fires were machine gun and rifle positions in and about four pillboxes, six concrete bunkers, a forester's lodge, and a custom house. The forest and deep ravines formed a kind of moat around the entire position. Where trees and underbrush had encroached upon fields of fire, the Germans had cut them away. In some places rows of barbed wire entanglements stood six to ten deep. The snow hid a veritable quilt of lethal antipersonnel mines.

It took only a matter of minutes after the attack began for Colonel Hirschfelder to determine that his hope of surprise was empty. The road junction bristled with fire. Mortar and artillery shells burst in the treetops. Exploding mines brought down man after man. One after another, eight men whose job was to clear a narrow path for the 1st Battalion were killed or seriously wounded by mines. Bangalore torpedoes set beneath the barbed wire failed to ignite because fuzes were wet. One platoon of the 2nd Battalion nevertheless pressed through five aprons of barbed wire before enemy fire at last forced a halt; yet several more aprons of unbreached wire lay ahead.

As night came the weather turned colder. Drenched to the skin, the men were miserable. Their clothing froze stiff. Through the night they tried to keep warm by painfully etching some form of foxhole or slit trench in the frozen earth. In the woods southeast of Wahlerscheid, experience of the 99th Division's 395th Infantry roughly paralleled that of the 9th Infantry.

Repeated attempts to assault and to outflank the Wahlerscheid position through the day of 14 December ended in failure.

13 December 1944

No letter today. Just this:

* TIDBIT *

about The "Neglected Objective"
The Roer River Dams

CLICK TO ENLARGE

The information that follows was extracted from The Siegfried Line Campaign written by Charles B. MacDonald for the U.S. Army's Center for Military History (1990), Chapter XXVI, page 597. Go to that site to see footnotes and attributions.

While American troops were approaching the Roer in late November and early December, concern was mounting in command circles about the obstacle that remained before sizable forces might cross the river with reasonable safety. This obstacle was the neglected objective - the dams on the upper reaches of the Roer which the Germans might employ to produce flood waters to isolate any force that had crossed the Roer.

Perhaps the explanation for the sins of ommission that made the sobriquet "neglected objective" applicable to the dams lay in the great expectations that had accompanied start of the November offensive. Perhaps the American command anticipated a rapid advance which might produce capture of the dams in the natural course of events. Or perhaps delay in launching a ground attack against the dams could be attributed to a hope that the dams might be breached from the air and the threat of controlled flooding thereby eliminated. If bombs could break the Urft Dam, upstream from the massive, earthen Schwammenauel Dam, the water level in the Schwammenauel reservoir might be raised to a point near the crest of the earthen dam, whereupon bombs might dig deep enough into the earth to get a small flow of water moving across the top of the dam. Erosion would do the rest.

Urft Dam


Schwammenauel Dam

The chief proponent of the scheme to bomb the Roer River Dams was the ground commander most directly concerned with eliminating the dams, General Hodges. At least as early as 18 November, the First Army commander began studying the dams with an eye toward air bombardment and on 22 November urged General Bradley to support the plan. When the G-3 for Air at 12th Army Group passed the request to SHAEF, the air officers at Eisenhower's headquarters allotted the project to the Royal Air Force, which specialized in the kind of low-level, precision bombing that would be required. The successful RAF attack on the Moehne Dam in the Ruhr in 1943, for example, came readily to mind. Yet apparently after consulting with the RAF, SHAEF air officers the next day, 23 November, reported the proposal impracticable. On the other hand, the air officers agreed that if the 12th Army Group considered breaching the dams "of paramount importance," SHAEF Air would "reconsider the matter."

A week later, on 30 November, General Hodges learned with immense satisfaction that the RAF had finally consented to try to blow the dams, but his hopes that this would solve the problem were dashed during the next few days by unfavorable weather. On 30 November and the first two days of December, planned attacks against the dams had to be canceled because of the weather, while on 3 December 190 aircraft made the flight over the dams but failed to attack, presumably because of poor visibility. The next day 200 aircraft flew over the target, but only 25 Lancasters and 3 Mosquitos actually attacked. Damage to the dams was discouragingly negligible. Another attack on 5 December was canceled because of poor visibility.

On 5 December SHAEF took another look at the question of breaching the dams from the air. The commander of the Royal Air Force Bomber Command, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur T. Harris, objected to the project on the theory that irreplaceable personnel were being wasted in an effort foredoomed to failure. Yet so impressed by now with the importance of the target was the Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower, that he ordered the attacks to be pushed over all objections.

Three days later, on 8 December, 205 aircraft dropped 797 tons of bombs on the Urft and Schwammenauel Dams and on the regulating dam between the two, the Paulushof. Though two hits were registered on the Urft and 18 on the Schwammenauel, neither dam was broken. Yet for all the frustration and negligible results involved thus far, the First Army commander, General Hodges, remained firm in his belief that the dams could be broken from the air. A thousand bombers a day, Hodges believed, "should be sent over until the dam is broken."

After another three-day wait occasioned by the weather, 230 Lancasters again attacked the dams. Of these, 178 concentrated against the Urft with 1,065 tons of bombs; but results again were discouraging. The bombs cut the top of the dam at the south end, allowing some water to spill through, but not enough. Although the RAF consented to two more tries, on 13 and 14 December, weather again forced cancellation. The air effort had failed.

Even while the air program continued, General Hodges, for all his insistence that the dams could be breached from the air, was making plans for a ground attack. Early in December he directed General Gerow's V Corps to seize the dams. General Gerow issued his field order for the attack on 7 December. The target date was 13 December 1944.

In planning the corps maneuver, General Gerow decided to eschew the possibility of three concentric attacks at first in favor of a double envelopment by two divisions. The depleted condition of the 8th Division in the north, which might have formed a third prong, and the fact that the fighting for the Brandenberg-Bergstein ridge had drawn enemy strength to the north no doubt influenced this decision.

The north wing of the envelopment was to be formed by the 78th Division. Attacking through the Monschau Corridor, the 78th first was to clear the pillbox- and village-studded plateau which marks the start of the corridor, then to continue northeast along the Strauch-Schmidt highway through extremities of the Huertgen Forest to Schmidt. From Schmidt the 78th Division might come upon the Roer River Dams from the north.