24 July, 1944

V-MAIL

438^th AAA AW BN

APO 403 % Postmaster, N.Y.

France

24 July, 1944        1030

Dearest sweetheart –

Happy Anniversary! And now we’ve known each other an entire year. I do wish we could be celebrating together, darling – but maybe next year we’ll really tie one on. Boy – I sure would like to get fried, boiled, stewed – or just plain stinko! But with you – of course. I’ve had a bottle of Cognac for weeks now and the only part that’s gone is that which I gave my boys the nite I got it. Some of the men over here are really doing some plain and fancy drinking – but I’ll still reserve my drinking for special occasions.

Last nite we had a chance to see a movie, again. “The Uninvited” – with Ruth Hussey and R. Milland – a fair story. We had a few interruptions – which made it even more weird. I got a letter from Mary – with medallions galore for Pete and me. Also got one from Lawrence – of July 10 – but none from you, darling. I wonder if our mail is being held up again – and for what purpose.

Work at the hospital is still quiet – but they work it that way i.e. they flood them with cases for about 2½ - 3 weeks and then ease off for about 10 days. We should start working again soon.

So long for now, sweetheart, remember I LOVE YOU – and that I’m very very glad I love you – to put it in simple terms!! Love to all.

All my love to you –

Greg

* TIDBIT *

about Operation Cobra's False Start

CLICK ON PICTURES TO ENLARGE

Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory had set the "Cobra" H-Hour at 1300, 24 July. On the morning of 24 July he went to Normandy to observe the operation and found the sky overcast with thick clouds. Deciding that visibility was inadequate for the air attack, he ordered a postponement. Unfortunately, he was too late. The message announcing his decision reached England only a few minutes before the actual bombing was to commence in France. Although the planes were ordered to return without making their bomb runs, it was impossible to get them all back. In accordance with the original planning, six groups of fighter-bombers and three bombardment divisions (about 1,600 heavy bombers) had departed their bases in England and headed toward France. Only the medium bombers, scheduled to bomb last, had not left the ground when the postponement order came. Of the six groups of fighter-bombers in the air, three received the recall order before they dropped their bombs. The other three bombed the general target area, a narrow strip, and certain targets north of the Périers-St. Lô highway, with no observed results. The postponement message to the heavy bombers kept back only a few planes in the last formation.

Ignorant that "Cobra" had been postponed, pilots of the great majority of the heavy bombers guided their big craft on toward the target. Because no precise radio channels had been designated for emergency communication, there was no certain means of transmitting the news of the postponement to these planes. While air force personnel in France attempted to get word to the craft aloft, the first formation of 500 heavy bombers arrived over the target area. Fortunately, they found visibility so poor that no attack was made. The second formation found cloud conditions so bad that only 35 aircraft, after making three bomb runs to identify the target, released their loads. Over 300 bombers of the third formation, with slightly improved weather conditions, dropped their bombs - about 550 tons of high explosive and 135 tons of fragmentation - before the postponement message finally got through to cancel the remainder of the strike.

The 24 July bombing was unfortunate, not only because of the likelihood of negating the surprise planned for "Cobra," but also because it killed 25 men and wounded 131 of the 30th Division.The tragedy was the result of one accident. The lead bombardier of a heavy bomber formation had had difficulty moving his bomb release mechanism and had inadvertently released a portion of his bombs over the wrong location. The fifteen aircraft flying in the formation followed his example and released their bombs. The bomb load fell 2,000 yards north of the Périers-St. Lô highway.

CLICK ON PICTURES TO ENLARGE

Dead and wounded of the 30th buried beneath an avalanche
of dirt thrown by the accidental bombing on 24 July 1944.
(Close-up, below)

Infantrymen and medics dig out a soldier half-buried
as a result of "friendly" aircraft hitting the 30th Division,
117th Infantry Regiment (also shown above).


Medics preparing the wounded for transport after
the bombing accident on 24 July 1944.

The bombardment accident released a flood of controversy. To provide additional protection for the ground forces, General Bradley had recommended that the planes make their bomb runs laterally across the front, parallel to the front lines, instead of approaching over the heads of American troops and perpendicular to the front. Recognizing that pilots preferred a perpendicular approach to minimize antiaircraft interference, he had suggested that the planes use the sun for concealment - if the attack occurred in the morning, the bombers could fly from east to west; in the afternoon, they could attack over a reverse course. In either case, the straight road between Périers and St. Lô would be an unmistakably clear landmark as a flank guide. Having expected a lateral approach to the target area, General Bradley was astonished and shocked when he learned that the planes had made a perpendicular bomb run. Using a perpendicular approach, Bradley said later, was an act of treachery on the part of the Air Forces, "a serious breach of good faith in planning." Other ground commanders had also anticipated a lateral approach, and their surprise was deepened by the horror that the news of casualties brought. But full agreement had never been reached.

On the ground, VII Corps had executed the initial part of the "Cobra" attack by withdrawing the front-line troops of the 9th and 30th Divisions several hundred yards to the north. The poor weather conditions had prompted commanders to wonder whether the lack of visibility would cancel the air bombardment, but General Collins was characteristically optimistic. He believed that the planes would get through the haze. Even if the heavy bombers were not able to take part in the air attack, he felt that the fighter-bombers would be on hand and that their bombardment would give sufficient impetus for the attack. He therefore told his subordinate commanders to go ahead. If the fighter-bomber effort proved insufficient, he expected the heavy bombers to return on the following day.

Word that the air bombardment had been postponed reached the ground troops just before the bombardment actually started. Why then had the bombs been dropped? Half an hour later General Collins learned that "Cobra" was postponed on the ground as well as in the air. However, Collins realized that the withdrawal of the 9th and 30th Divisions had created a vacuum that the Germans would fill unless the infantry returned to the vicinity of the Périers-St. Lô highway. Therefore, to prevent the enemy from moving north of the Périers-St. Lô highway, the three infantry divisions had to attack at 1300 as though "Cobra" were going into effect. In reality, the divisions were seeking to restore the front line that had existed before the air bombardment.

The abortive air bombardment on 24 July had obviously alerted the Germans to the American ground attack that followed. Enemy artillery fire began to fall in large volume. All three assault divisions had a difficult time that afternoon. On the corps right, the 9th Division committed its three regiments: the 60th Infantry battled enemy troops that had infiltrated behind the withdrawal; a reinforced battalion of the 47th Infantry struggled until dark to gain a single hedgerow; two battalions of the 39th Infantry fought eight hours to reduce a strongpoint and took 77 casualties. In the corps center, the 4th Division committed the 8th Infantry, which attacked in a column of battalions with tank support; after two hours of heavy fighting and a loss of 27 killed and 70 wounded, the regiment reached a point 100 yards north of the highway. On the corps left, the 30th Division did not advance at once because the assault elements were stunned and demoralized by the bombardment accident. It took almost an hour for the units to recover and reorganize, by which time enemy artillery fire had subsided. The division then advanced and reoccupied its original lines.

There was no time for recrimination on 24 July, for an immediate decision had to be made. Should General Bradley agree to another bombardment under the same terms and thereby indirectly condone the possibility of additional American casualties? Or should he insist on changing the pattern of air attack, which would mean postponing "Cobra" for several days at least? With higher headquarters anxious for action, General Bradley had little choice. The ground attack on the afternoon of 24 July had re-established the necessary "Cobra" conditions. Prospects for good weather on 25 July were improving. The question whether the premature bombing had lost the Americans tactical surprise was to be resolved at once: the Allies would launch "Cobra" again at 1100, 25 July.

23 July, 1944

V-MAIL

438^th AAA AW BN

APO 403 % Postmaster, N.Y.

France

23 July, 1944         1030

Good morning, darling –

It’s Sunday morning and right at the moment, I haven’t a thing to do. Pete dropped over a few minutes ago and when he saw I was writing you he asked me to be sure and send his best regards to you and to thank you for remembering him. I always pass on your regards, dear, but usually forget the reverse.

Everything sees to be going along well – although somewhat slowly in this sector at present. We haven’t been getting the best break in the weather – but we will soon. News from all other sources is so good – I actually worry about it. If it hasn’t much background – there will be an awful let-down. The fact is it can’t last too much longer, darling – and you now what that means. In case you don’t – it means that even with sweating out an Army of Occupation – I’ll be coming home to marry you. Gosh I hope we aren’t being too optimistic. For the time being there’s still plenty of fighting around here – I’m afraid – but we’ve got the Jerries number – and they know it.

No mail again – but maybe today, sweetheart. Hope all is well at home, my love to the folks – and

My deepest love, dear

Greg

* TIDBIT *

about Operation "Goodwood"

CLICK ON MAP TO ENLARGE

As a hush fell over the American front after the capture of St. Lô, intense activity began in the British sector. The British Second Army launched a strong attack, Operation "Goodwood", that promised the Allies an excellent chance of achieving a breakthrough. Had it succeeded, "Cobra" may not have been necessary.

"Goodwood" had grown indirectly out of the situation on the American front. At a conference on 10 July General Bradley had admitted to General Montgomery that he was discouraged about the offensive in the Cotentin Peninsula and that he was thinking of the new "Cobra" idea, not yet completely formulated. General Montgomery had advised him to "take all the time he needed" in the Cotentin. To assist, the British would continue the basic Montgomery pattern of action: attempt to draw the German strength away from the American sector, hold the eastern part of the front firmly and keep the enemy forces opposite the British engaged and off balance by limited objective attacks. Immediately after the conference, General Dempsey, the commander of the Second British Army, suggested that the British might take a more positive role in the campaign and launch a strong attack of their own. Montgomery's first reaction was negative, but on reflection he ordered planning started that same day. He alerted Dempsey to hold a corps of three armored divisions in reserve for a "massive stroke" east of the Orne River from Caen to Falaise. By 13 July three armored divisions were ready under control of the British 8 Corps.

By launching "Goodwood", the British would throw a left hook at the Germans; by following quickly with "Cobra" the Americans would strike with a right cross. The immediate objective of "Goodwood" was the rolling plain southeast of Caen, rising toward Falaise. Though neither Montgomery nor Dempsey mentioned Falaise specifically in their orders, they and other commanders were thinking of Falaise and even of Argentan as objectives perhaps quickly attainable if the battle developed favorably.

Meanwhile, to protect the open country around Caen, Eberbach, the German commander of Panzer Group West, had established a zone defense composed of infantry positions echeloned in depth and covered by antitank fire. The main battle positions, about 1,200 yards deep, consisted of three lines, while local reserves had organized another defensive line about a mile to the rear.

The two major deficiencies of the air bombardment launched earlier at Caen were to be corrected for "Goodwood". Only fighter-bombers were to attack in the zone where armored divisions were to make the main effort, and thus the extensive cratering that had slowed armor at Caen would be avoided. The ground troops were to attack immediately after the air strike in order to capitalize on the paralyzing effect of the bombardment on the Germans. While British naval units fired from the Seine Bay in support, bombers in the largest concentration yet utilized in direct support of a single ground attack loosed their explosives near Caen at daylight, 18 July. Almost 1,700 planes of the RAF Bomber Command and the U.S. Eighth Air Force, plus almost 400 medium and fighter-bombers of the U.S. Ninth Air Force, dropped more than 8,000 tons of bombs to open a path for British ground forces.

CLICK ON PICTURES TO ENLARGE

B-24 Liberator passes over area of mushrooming fragmentation
bombs, clearing out enemy troops and installations a few miles in
front of advancing British forces. Picture taken on 18 July 1944.

The 8 Corps of the Second British Army, employing three armored divisions, closely followed the air bombardment of 18 July and advanced over three miles in little more than an hour. Tactical surprise and the effect of the bombardment were responsible. Eberbach had not expected Montgomery, who had a reputation for caution, to make a major attack out of the narrow bridgehead he possessed east of the Orne. Even after the attack got under way, Eberbach could not really believe that it was the British main effort. Montgomery had achieved surprise by moving his assault divisions across the Orne only a few hours before the jump-off. With German troops destroyed or dazed by the bombardment, the divisions manning defensive positions in the bombed corridor were momentarily paralyzed. Despite valiant efforts to reorganize, they were unable to offer real resistance to the British armored attack. From about 0900 to noon, the 8 Corps was on the verge of achieving a clean penetration. Only when the British hit the enemy's antitank and flak guns on the last defensive line was the advance halted.

Recovering from the surprise by noon, Eberbach mobilized and committed four tank battalions and four infantry battalions of the 1st SS and 21st Panzer Divisions in a counterattack, which dispelled British hope of further immediate penetration. Though the British had lost 270 tanks and 1,500 men on the first day of attack, "Goodwood" continued on 19 July as the British endeavored to extend their gains by limited local attacks. Resistance continued strong, and the British that day lost 131 tanks and incurred 1,100 casualties. Further attempts to advance on 20 July, at a cost of 68 tanks and 1,000 casualties, resulted in little progress. When a heavy thunderstorm on the afternoon of 20 July turned the countryside into a quagmire, "Goodwood" came to an end. An ineffective German counterattack on 21 July signaled the close of the operation.

During the four-day attack, 8 Corps had secured thirty-four square miles of ground and the Canadian 2d Corps had captured the remainder of the city of Caen and part of the plain immediately to the southeast. The 8 Corps lost 500 tanks and over 4 ,000 men; tank losses in the entire operation totaled 36 percent of all British tanks on the Continent. Although territorial gains were small, particularly when compared with losses and with the expenditure of the air bombardment, Montgomery's attack by 20 July had exhausted Eberbach's reserves.

While the Germans, despite discouragement, were content that they had fought as well as they could, the Allies were far from happy. General Eisenhower had expected a drive across the Orne from Caen and an exploitation toward the Seine Basin and Paris. Montgomery had been more cautious in his anticipations. On the afternoon of 18 July, the first day of the attack, General Montgomery had been "very well satisfied" to have caught the enemy off balance. The effect of the air support seemed "decisive." The Second British Army had three armored divisions operating in the open country southeast of Caen, and armored cars and tanks, he thought, were threatening Falaise. Two days later, Montgomery judged that the purpose of the attack had been accomplished. The 8 Corps had advanced nearly six miles and taken 2,000 prisoners, all of Caen had been secured, and the Orne bridgehead had been more than doubled in size. General Montgomery on 20 July instructed General Dempsey to withdraw his armored troops into reserve and replace them with infantry.

To those in the Allied camp who had expected a decisive breakthrough and exploitation, expressions of satisfaction seemed hollow. Disappointment led General Eisenhower to write Montgomery on 21 July to question whether they saw "eye to eye on the big problems." He reiterated that the Allied needs were the Breton ports; increased space for maneuver, administration, and airfields; and the destruction of German military forces. He remarked that he had been "extremely hopeful and optimistic" that "Goodwood", by "tremendous air attack," would have a decisive effect on the battle of Normandy. That did not come about, and as a result, he was pinning his immediate hopes on Bradley's attack.

22 July, 1944

438^th AAA AW BN

APO 403 % Postmaster, N.Y.

France

22 July, 1944         0940

Dearest one –

Once upon a time Saturday meant a. no school, b. no p.m. classes, c. football games, d. a week-end off from interning, e. office hours in the p.m. and something to do in the evening. And now, dear, Saturday means nothing – nothing but another day to wait through, to leave behind.

I’m reading a book – or I did yesterday. There was a quotation in it, poet not given, and it went something like this:

“Four things greater than all things are,

  Women and horses and power and war.”

I don’t know about the horses, but the others strike home. There is nothing greater in my life at present sweetheart than a woman – you, dear – and the knowledge of you, what you mean to me now and what you are going to mean to me in the future – is certainly the greatest thing that has ever happened to me. How unfortunate that two other great things – power and war – have to stand opposed, preventing us from being together!

The last two days have been really dull and I’ve had plenty of time to think. And you know, dear, I had the opportunity of starting way back in the beginning and following us right up to the present. I was amazed mostly at how my life is now centered about one person in every thought I have; I’m amazed at how I’m filled with a love I never felt before for anyone the way I feel it for you. I know, darling, that I don’t express it often enough – but you’ll have to believe me when I say that the most agonizing part of the war for me has not been the sleeping in fox holes, the ducking low when evening shells are bursting, the fear which every honest person must admit pervades him when he realizes what might happen to him; no – none of these – terrible as they are, have bothered me so much as the haunting thought that I could be with you now, married to you, living as a normal couple should, loving you and doing things for you that would make you happy. I hate to think how I would have borne this war if I hadn’t been fortunate enough to meet you, love you, become engaged to you. Even the most moronic soldier wants to go home and seems to be fighting for just that and almost nothing more. You can imagine then, dear, how much a person who thinks a bit more deeply about it – feels.

I can’t seem to become imbued with the spirit of fighting for this freedom or that – although fundamentally I know that that is what I should be fighting for. But one can’t help become selfish and think in terms of his own small world – and darling, that world right now includes you and me and our families. I’m afraid that war – instead of giving me a broad perspective – is narrowing mine down.

Sweetheart – you must not gather from all this that I am unhappy; Quite the contrary. I’m trying to convey to you that I love you so deeply that I miss sorely my not being with you, talking with you, looking at you, hearing you laugh, holding you and kissing you – but despite my missing all that, I thank my lucky stars that I have someone like you to miss. I suppose that all sounds like a paradox and maybe I sound mixed up – so I’ll leave it right here –

The book I referred to above that I’m reading is “So Little Time” by J.P. Marquand. So far it’s excellent. If you get a chance – read it dear. It hits home – a good many times. The hospital has been slow the past couple of days and I’ve had a little breathing spell.

Everything is going along well here and I’m feeling fine and rested. Boy oh boy will I crush you when I see you! You’ll have to learn how to say uncle in almost 6 different languages. I’m going to love you so hard and so long that I wonder who is going to look after my practice.

Darling – no mail again yesterday – but surely today. One year ago today – on a Saturday (it was then the 24th) I met you – and it was certainly a lucky turning point in my life. My having been away makes little difference – dear – because I feel I know you and love you much more than even one year’s worth. And we’ll celebrate this anniversary, so help me – and many, many more.

I’ll stop now, sweetheart. I hope all is going well at home. Send my love to the family and

My deepest love is yours –

Greg

* TIDBIT *

about the Culin and Douglas Hedgerow Cutters

CLICK ON PICTURE TO ENLARGE

Culin Hedgerow Cutter

When a tank climbed over a hedgerow, its lightly armored belly was exposed to enemy fire while its guns could not be lowered enough to provide protection. A member of a light tank 102nd Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron of the 2nd Armored Division, Sergeant Curtis G. Culin, III, devised a sort of fork made of iron which could be attached to the front of a tank, thus enabling it to cut through a hedgerow rather than climb over it. Troops would then follow through the openings in the hedgerows to support the armor.

A maintenance expert in Culin's unit worked on the technical aspects of the problem and developed a four-pronged plow from angle iron that the Germans used on the beaches of Normandy. Soon the device was shown to the commanding general of the 2nd Infantry Division and Generals Gerow (V Corps) and Bradley (1st Army). General Bradley immediately ordered that everything be done to equip as many tanks as possible with the device before the final breakout was attempted. The hedgerow-breaching "tusks" led to the tanks being called "Rhino" tanks. Between 15 July and 25 July, when Operation Cobra started, over 500 Rhinos were manufactured. By the time the attack was launched, 3 of every 5 tanks which were to be involved had been modified. Tankers also added sandbags to provide added protection against the German shells. For his innovation, Sergeant Culin was awarded the Legion of Merit. Four months after his invention, he lost a leg to a land mine in the Huertgen Forest. When he returned to the United States, he became a salesman.

CLICK ON PICTURES TO ENLARGE

Curtis Culin, III

On 22 July, a modified M5A1 light tank was demonstrated to Gen. George S. Patton and a team from the 3rd Armored Division. After the demonstration, the division was ordered to build its own Rhino devices on a crash program. A workshop was set up in St. Jean de Daye under the supervision of Warrant Officer Douglas, who had been a professional welder in civilian life. Douglas didn't favor the Culin design, and devised a modified version that was distinguished by a pair of triangular plates at either end which he felt would penetrate the hedge better. A total of 57 of these 'Douglas cutters' were attached to tanks of the 3rd Armored Division prior to Cobra. The various types of Rhino devices were all considered top secret, and Bradley ordered that none be used until the main operation began.

These photos show the Douglas cutter with triangular plates.


The photo below shows a Douglas cutter being soldered onto a tank
in a square in the town of Saint Jean-de-Daye
on 26 July 1944, before the breakout.


St. Jean-de-Daye on 26 July 1944
while Greg was there...

Here is a video of that welding activity:

In fact, operational accounts of the 2nd Armored Division in Operation Cobra provide few indications that the devices ever played much of a role. This had more to do with the conduct of the fighting than with any technical virtue or failing of the Rhinos. The preliminary air attack against the Panzer Lehr Division left large craters making tank runs between hedgerows quite difficult. But these air attacks also shattered the main force opposing the 2nd Armored Division. As a result, the division aggressively pushed through the German defences. Rather than struggle cross-country through the bocage, the 2nd Armored Division used the country roads wherever possible, avoiding the need to use the Rhinos

21 July, 1944

V-MAIL

438^th AAA AW BN

APO 403 % Postmaster, N.Y.

France

21 July, 1944

My dearest sweetheart –

I am now sitting in the back of our big truck writing this V-mail to you. It happens to be the driest spot available at the moment – but it’s quite comfortable. As a matter of fact I’ve been rummaging around through some of my boxes and bags and I came across my clarinet and as soon as I’m through writing this – I think I’ll try blowing a few tunes out of it. Anyway – I ought to end up with more room here than there is now!

Greg's "large truck" may have been similar
to this 1/2 ton 4x4 WC54 Field Ambulance

I haven’t heard from you in a couple of days, now, dear, but that’s because of the recent mail set-up which should be corrected in another day or two. I thought so hard of you last night – it was almost impossible to stand it. I just wished so hard that you were with me or I with you – that I had to change my line of thought. Gosh, darling, I do love you a tremendous lot and I can hardly wait to get home and show you what I mean. But I will!! Hope you’re hearing from me regularly now. Love to the folks and

All my love, dear

Greg

* TIDBIT *

about A Quiet Period

CLICK ON PICTURES TO ENLARGE

(L to R) Lt Gen Omar Bradley 1st Army,
Maj. Gen Leonard Gerow V Corps
Gen Dwight Eisenhower,
Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force
Lt Gen Lawton Joseph "Lightning Joe" Collins,
VII Corps, on 21 July 1944

According to HyperWar's US Army in WWII: ETO Breakout and Pursuit written by Martin Blumenson:

Between the end of the earlier July offensive and the launching of COBRA, there was a lull for about a week. Not only did the period of inactivity permit plans to be perfected and the troops to be better organized for the attack, it also gave the men some rest and time to repair the equipment damaged in the battle of the hedgerows. Units were able to integrate replacements. By the time COBRA got under way, all the divisions on the Continent were close to authorized strength in equipment and personnel and most had undergone a qualitative improvement.

The quiet period before COBRA also made possible increased comforts such as hot meals, showers, and clothing changes. Even though B rations - a non-packaged food affording a variety of hot meals - had reached the Continent early in July and were ready for issue to the troops, the battle of the hedgerows had prevented their being substituted for combat 10-in-1, K, and C rations until later in the month. With kitchens set up to serve hot meals, "it was amazing how many cows and chickens wandered into minefields... and ended up as sizzling platters."

As Allied leaders searched rain-filled skies for a break in the clouds that might permit the air bombardment planned for COBRA, a phrase of the Air Corps hymn came to mind: "Nothing can stop the Army Air Corps." Nothing, they added, except weather. While impatient commanders waited anxiously for sunshine, and while General Bradley facetiously assumed the blame for having "failed to make arrangements for proper weather," the First U.S. Army rested and prepared for the attack.

20 July, 1944

V-MAIL

438^th AAA AW BN

APO 403 % Postmaster, N.Y.

France

20 July, 1944

Dearest darling –

Good morning! I’m getting an early start today because I expect to be busy a little later. No mail yesterday and probably none today.

Yesterday was another easy day at the hospital and it may be like that for another day or two. In the evening several of us went to a nearby quartermaster shower and saw something new in the line of Army efficiency. Before entering, we passed thru a tent and told a soldier what size underwear, and socks we wore. We were given new socks, underwear – shirts and shorts – plus a large-sized Cannon bath towel. We could keep our dirty clothes or discard them – as we saw fit. How’s that for up to date service?

All is quiet at present, sweetheart, and we’re enjoying our relaxation. I thought a great deal about you yesterday, dear, and last year and our meeting each other and of the first night I poked my head thru your door – and lots of other pleasant things that happened last summer. Best of all – I ended up by realizing that you are really my fiancée and that I have something real and lovely to come home to – and boy! that thought makes me very happy! I love you very much – darling. Never forget that!! Love to all at home.

All my love for now –

Greg.

Route of the Question Mark



(A) Deville to (B) St. Jean-de-Daye, France
11 July to 20 July 1944

From Page 24 from The Route of the Question Mark:

July 20... St. Jean de Daye.  We lost S/Sgt COOK, our mess Sgt. There was a false gas alarm which threw everyone into a panic. We witnessed the spectacular bombing operation on 25 July 1944. Wave after wave of B-17's and B-24's dropping bombs on the German lines ahead of us at Saint Lo. Pvt DAVIES joined the Infantry here.

* TIDBIT *

about the Failed Attempt on Hitler's Life

On 20 July 1944, an attempt was made to assassinate Adolf Hitler, Führer of the Third Reich, inside his Wolfsschanze (Wolf's Lair) field headquarters near Rastenburg, East Prussia. The plot was the culmination of the efforts of several groups in the German Resistance to overthrow the Nazi-led German government. The failure of both the assassination and the military coup d'état which was planned to follow it led to the arrest of at least 7,000 people by the Gestapo. According to records of the Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 4,980 people were executed, resulting in the destruction of the organized resistance movement in Germany.

Since 1938, conspiratorial groups planning an overthrow of some kind had existed in the German Army and in the German Military Intelligence Organization. Early leaders of these plots included Brigadier-General Hans Oster, General Ludwig Beck and Field Marshal Erwin von Witzleben. Oster was the deputy head of the Military Intelligence Office. Military conspiratorial groups exchanged ideas with civilian, political and intellectual resistance groups. Plans to stage an overthrow and prevent Hitler from launching a new world war were developed in 1938 and 1939, but were aborted because of the indecision of Army Generals Franz Halder and Walther von Brauchitsch, and the failure of the western powers to oppose Hitler's aggressions until 1939.

In 1942, a new conspiratorial group formed, led by Colonel Henning von Tresckow, a member of Field Marshal Fedor von Bock's staff. Their most important recruit was General Friedrich Olbricht, head of the General Army Office headquarters at the Bendlerblock in central Berlin, who controlled an independent system of communications to Reserve Units throughout Germany. Linking this asset to Tresckow's resistance group in Army Group Center created a viable coup apparatus. Tresckow systematically recruited oppositionists to the Group’s staff, making it the nerve center of the Army resistance. Tresckow and Olbricht formulated a plan to assassinate Hitler and stage an overthrow during Hitler's visit to the headquarters of Army Group Center at Smolensk in March 1943, by placing a bomb on his plane. The bomb failed to detonate, and a second attempt a week later at an exhibition of captured Soviet weaponry in Berlin also failed.

Henning von Tresckow

By mid-1943 the tide of war was turning decisively against Germany. The Army plotters and their civilian allies became convinced that Hitler must be assassinated so that a government acceptable to the western Allies could be formed and a separate peace negotiated in time to prevent a Soviet invasion of Germany. In August 1943 Tresckow met a young staff officer, Lieutenant Colonel Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg, for the first time. For some time this man's religious scruples had prevented him from coming to the conclusion that assassination was the correct way to achieve a negotiated peace. After the Battle of Stalingrad in December 1942, however, he had come to the conclusion that not assassinating Hitler would be a greater moral evil.

Olbricht now put forward a new strategy for staging a coup against Hitler. The Reserve Army already had an operational plan called "Operation Valkyrie" which was to be used in the event that the disruption caused by the Allied bombing of German cities caused a breakdown in law and order, or an uprising by the millions of slave laborers from occupied countries now being used in German factories. Olbricht suggested that this plan could be used to mobilize the Reserve Army for the purpose of a coup. In August and September 1943, Colonel Henning von Tresckow drafted the "revised" Valkyrie plan and new supplementary orders. A secret declaration began with the words: "The Führer Adolf Hitler is dead! A treacherous group of party leaders has attempted to exploit the situation by attacking our embattled soldiers from the rear in order to seize power for themselves." Detailed instructions were written for the occupation of government ministries in Berlin, Himmler's headquarters in East Prussia, radio stations, telephone offices, and other Nazi apparatus through military districts, and concentration camps.

During 1943 and early 1944 there were at least four failed attempts organized by von Tresckow and von Stauffenberg to get one of the military conspirators near enough to Hitler for long enough to kill him with hand grenades, bombs or a revolver: in March 1943, in late November 1943, in February 1944 and on 11 March 1944. But this task was becoming increasingly difficult. As the war situation deteriorated, Hitler no longer appeared in public and rarely visited Berlin. By the summer of 1944, the Gestapo was closing in on the conspirators. There was a sense that time was running out, both on the battlefield, where the Eastern front was in full retreat and where the Allies had landed in France on 6 June, and in Germany, where the resistance's room for maneuvering was rapidly contracting. The belief that this was the last chance for action seized the conspirators. By this time, the core of the conspirators had begun to think of themselves as doomed men, whose actions were more symbolic than real.

The conspirators scored a major coup in early July when they managed to initiate Erwin Rommel, the famed "Desert Fox," into their ranks. Rommel was by far the most popular officer in Germany, and was also the first active-duty field marshal to lend support to the notion of ending of Hitler's rule. However, although Rommel felt he had to, as he put it, "come to the rescue of Germany," he thought killing Hitler would make Hitler a martyr. Instead, he wanted him arrested and hauled before a court-martial for his many crimes.

On Saturday 1 July 1944 von Stauffenberg was appointed Chief of Staff to General Friedrich Fromm at the Reserve Army headquarters in central Berlin. This position enabled von Stauffenberg to attend Hitler's military conferences and would thus give him an opportunity, perhaps the last that would present itself, to kill Hitler with a bomb or a pistol. On 11 July von Stauffenberg attended Hitler's conference carrying a bomb in his briefcase, but because the conspirators had decided that Heinrich Himmler and Hermann Göring should be killed simultaneously, he held back at the last minute since Himmler was not present. By 15 July, when von Stauffenberg again flew to the Wolfsschanze, this condition had been dropped. The plan was for von Stauffenberg to plant the briefcase with the bomb in Hitler's conference room with a timer running, excuse himself from the meeting, wait for the explosion, then fly back to Berlin. Again on 15 July the attempt was called off at the last minute. Himmler and Göring were present, but Hitler was called out of the room at the last moment; von Stauffenberg was able to intercept the bomb and prevent its discovery.

Claus von Stauffenberg

On 20 July, around 12:30PM as the conference began, von Stauffenberg made an excuse to use a washroom where he used pliers to crush the end of a pencil detonator inserted into a 1 kilogram (2.2 pound) block of plastic explosive wrapped in brown paper. The detonator consisted of a thin copper tube containing acid that would take ten minutes to silently eat through wire holding back the firing pin from the percussion cap. He then placed the primed bomb quickly inside his briefcase, having been told his presence was required. He entered the conference room and placed his briefcase under the table around which Hitler and more than 20 officers had gathered. After a few minutes, von Stauffenberg received a planned phone call and left the room. It is presumed that Colonel Heinz Brandt, who was standing next to Hitler, used his foot to move the briefcase aside by pushing it behind the leg of the conference table, thus unwittingly deflecting the blast from Hitler, but causing his own death when the bomb detonated between 12:40 and 12:50, demolishing the conference room.

Conference Room Wreckage, 20 July 1944

Three officers and the stenographer were seriously injured and died soon after. Hitler survived, as did everyone else who was shielded from the blast by the conference table leg. Hitler's trousers were singed and tattered and he suffered from a perforated eardrum, as did most of the other 24 people in the room. Hearing the explosion and seeing the smoke issuing from the broken windows of the concrete dispatch barracks, von Stauffenberg assumed that Hitler was dead, climbed into his staff car with his aide Werner von Haeften and managed to bluff his way past three checkpoints to exit the Wolfsschanze complex. Werner von Haeften then tossed a second unprimed bomb into the forest as they made a dash for Rastenburg airfield, reaching it before it could be realized that von Stauffenberg could be responsible for the explosion.

Werner von Haeften

At 16:40 von Stauffenberg and von Haeften arrived at the Bendlerblock. Learning that Hitler had not died, Fromm, presumably to protect himself, changed sides and attempted to have von Stauffenberg arrested. As Remer regained control of the city and word spread that Hitler was still alive, the less resolute members of the conspiracy in Berlin also now began to change sides. Fighting broke out in the Bendlerblock between officers supporting and opposing the coup, and von Stauffenberg was wounded. By 23:00 Fromm had regained control, hoping by a show of zealous loyalty to save himself. Ludwig Beck, realizing the situation was hopeless, shot himself at the command of Fromm — the first of many suicides in the coming days. Although at first Beck only just managed to seriously wound himself, he was shot in the neck by soldiers. Fromm convened an impromptu court martial consisting of himself, and sentenced Olbricht, von Stauffenberg, von Haeften and another officer, Albrecht Mertz von Quirnheim, to death. At 00:10 on 21 July they were executed in the courtyard outside, possibly to prevent them from revealing Fromm's involvement. Fromm went off to see Goebbels to claim credit for suppressing the coup. Goebbels' only reply to him was "You've been in a damned hurry to get your witnesses below ground." Fromm was immediately arrested and later, in March of 1945, was executed on charges he had failed to report and prevent the coup on 20 July.

CLICK ON IMAGES TO ENLARGE

Friedrich Fromm, Friedrich Olbricht, and Albrecht von Quirnheim

19 July, 1944

438^th AAA AW BN

APO 403 % Postmaster, N.Y.

France

19 July, 1944        0945

My dearest sweetheart –

It’s a quiet Wednesday morning and although there isn’t much in the line of news to write about, dear. I thought I’d ramble on for a bit anyway. We didn’t get any mail yesterday – but we’ve been averaging mail on about 4-5 days out of seven and that’s not much different from England. We get the Continental edition of the Stars and Stripes almost daily and every 2-3 weeks we get a batch of fairly recent magazines, including Life, Look, Esquire, and a bunch of Detective Stories, Mechanics etc. – which I never get around to reading. Oh yes – Coronet and Reader’s Digest are always included. The fact is dear – I don’t even get a chance to read my Medical Journals – but I do read Time.

Yesterday was an easy day at the hospital – they were cleaning out their cases. I got through about 1500 and instead of returning to battalion – I decided to take a trip down to the beach. It was only 10 miles away from where I was and it was a nice day. It was very pretty. The water was greenish-blue – but no one was in swimming. I hated to leave the area – but it was getting on towards supper hour and traffic on the roads is heavy – so we headed back.

For supper we had steak again – the “captured” cow is now fast disappearing. And then we had a real surprise. Our Special Service officer had dug up a film, rigged up some tentage and we had a movie at 2030. The amazing thing is that it was a new one – I believe – “See Here, Private Hargrove”. It was light and amusing and the boys got a kick out of it. And then to bed.

This morning I plan to take it easy and not go out to visit the batteries, but I’ll trip up to the hospital this p.m. and see if any new cases have been admitted. I believe I mentioned that we had laundry facilities at the hospital. We got ours back yesterday and you can’t imagine what a thrill it is, darling, to put some dirty clothes into a bag and get it back in a few days – nice and clean – although unpressed.

That just about brings me up to date with things, sweetheart. I try to tell you what’s going on and I hope you have some picture of it in your mind. Since I’ve been at the hospital – I haven’t had much time or opportunity to develop my conversational French – but I’ve picked up on my German – in conversing with some of the German prisoners working at the hospital. They were aid men in the German Army.

I suppose you must wonder how I get a chance to think of you at all, sweetheart, with all the running around I’ve been doing. Darling – in everything I do – you are with me – anyway – so I can’t forget you. When I climb out of my tent in the morning – I see “Wilma” in bright white letters on my jeep – which is parked right beside me (I’d rather have the original!) On the inside of my windshield – made out of copper wire is the name “Wilma” and it is so arranged – that as I sit in the jeep – it stares right at me. Do I need such constant reminders, dear, to make me think of you? Hardly – but I like to see your name around – and now when one of my drivers turns over the jeep to another – he invariably says “Take good care of Wilma."

If this could but all end soon and I could call you ‘Wilma’ – in person – I’d be very happy, darling. I dream of that often and I know it will materialize – with you as my own – my wife – my companion – my love. Dearest – I’ll have to close now. Give my love to the folks – and for now –

All my deepest love –

Greg

* TIDBIT *

about "See Here, Private Hargrove" (1944)

CLICK ON POSTER TO ENLARGE

The "real" Marion Hargrove began his writing career as a reporter for the Charlotte News in North Carolina and was unanimously voted Fort Bragg's "worst all-round selectee." According to contemporary sources, playwright Maxwell Anderson helped Hargrove find a publisher for his autobiography, which became a best-seller. And from his book came the movie. The Variety review noted that "the book...was a find and the cost of the film rights reasonable because the purchase was made long before the Hargrove piece hit the bookstalls and the best-seller class." Hargrove went on to a successful career as a screenwriter, authoring such films as The Music Man (1962) and Boys Night Out (1962).

Here is the original movie review, written by Bosley Crowther, as it appeared in The New York Times on 22 March 1944:

The personal (and private's) experiences of a young man named Marion Hargrove as one of the initially favored selectees in the present Army of the United States — experiences which are famously recounted in the book, "See Here, Private Hargrove" — are the basis for a rough-and-tumble comedy about a soldier's merry life, tagged with the same familiar title, which opened at the Astor last night. It may be that this joyous manifestation of fun and frolic at a basic training camp is a little bit wishful in its blinking of some of the harsher realities of war; it may be that its emphasis is slightly heavy upon the first person very singular. But Private (now Sergeant) Hargrove made the best of a solemn thing when he hit the ranks. And it may be said that Metro has done the same — or much the same — by his book.

For this is a strictly happy picture about a chuckle-headed kid and a couple of his classic companions in the transition phase from citizens to troops. It tells a story with a loose continuity of a boy's adventures in a world where regulations are amusingly broken and punishment is monotonously the same. The agreeable hero is persistently and forever getting himself in dutch by muddling his orders, fouling equipment and knocking over men of higher rank. And he is forever doing penance by polishing garbage cans. At the same time, he is serving none too willingly as a literary investment for one of his sharper pals, who finances a modest romance for him and generally directs his career in medias res. The fact that the boys are in the Army is an inconvenience which finally cramps their enterprise.

Gentlemen with Army experience will probably observe with some surprise the comparative cordiality of the sergeants and other disciplinarians in this film. They may also be somewhat dubious of the concentration upon one clumsy kid. Private Hargrove becomes a famous character a bit prematurely, one might say. But with Robert Walker playing him with a delightfully insouciant air and a smile which will mellow the ladies, it is easy to take him as such on the screen. Keenan Wynn also gives a winning performance as his plain-and-fancy swindler pal, and Donna Reed is poetically licensed as the girl whom he conveniently comes to love. George Offerman Jr. and William Phillips also make two genial G. I.'s—and Robert Benchley and Chill Wills do nicely, though conventionally, in minor roles.

As a chronicle of life in the Army, we would say that "See Here, Private Hargrove" is not the definitive article. But it makes a gay and entertaining film.

The proceeds from the premiére last evening went to the benefit of the American Red Cross.

The screen play for "See Here, Private Hargrove" was written by Harry Kurnitz, based on the Book by Marion Hargrove. It was directed by Wesley Ruggles and produced by George Haight for Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer. The movie starred Robert Walker as Private Hargrove, Donna Reed as Carol Holliday, Keenyn Wynn as Private Mulvehill, Robert Benchley as Mr. Holliday, Ray Collins as Brodie S. Griffith, Chill Wills as First Sergeant Cramp, Bob Crosby as Bob, Martin Linden as Mrs. Holliday, Grant Mitchell as Uncle George, George Offerman Jr. as Private Esty, Edward Fielding as General Dillon, Donald Curtis as Sergeant Heldon, Wm. Bill Phillips as Private Burk, and Douglas Fowley as Captain Manville.

Here is the movie trailer followed by a short clip from the movie:

18 July, 1944

V-MAIL

438^th AAA AW BN

APO 403 % Postmaster, N.Y.

France

18 July, 1944

Dearest darling –

Got your letter of 2 July yesterday and one from your mother of 3 July. Mother’s was very sweet – as always. Yours had the post-card showing a couple of “surgeons” and was very appropriate – considering what I’ve been doing for the past week. They’re still going strong at the hospital – although they should be closing down for a rest any day now. They usually work for about 2 weeks or so – not for several days and start all over again. So far we’re still comparatively near to them and I just hope it stays that way. As far as the hospital is concerned – I’ve been told to act as if I were part of it and to go ahead and do anything I want – which is darn white of them. The fellow in charge of the O.R. is a Greek and I think he must think I’m one too – because he’s been swell to me.

Sweetheart – you must not think that anything I write concerning my love for you is “guarded’ – as you wrote in the letter I received yesterday. I don’t know exactly what you mean. I have nothing to guard or be wary of. I too, write as I feel and I’ve thought I revealed myself completely to you. If not – I’ve meant to. I can only say that I love you deeply, am proud you are my fiancée and I can hardly wait to marry you! Is that guarded?? Love to all dear and

All my love to you for always

Greg

* TIDBIT *

about Entering Saint-Lô

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The “Hun Chaser” tank rumbles through the debris of St-Lô
while an American soldier looks for snipers with field glasses and
poised pistol, before blockbusters have cleared the streets of rubble.

By 15 June, the 9th had cleaned out the German strongpoints east of the Taute and gained the crossroads at les Champs-de-Losque. But just south of that village, the 9th struck the enemy's new MLR (Main Line of Resistance), defending the higher ground rising toward the Périers-St-Lô highway. For the next two days of very severe effort, net gains were negligible. Finally, on 17-18 July, the 39th Infantry broke through; during these two days the 9th Division pushed to within a few hundred yards of the St-Lô highway, and crossed it with patrols. The 9th and the 30th together had gained the ground which First Army proposed to use for its jump-off in the breakthrough operation, Cobra.

29th Infantry Division soldiers lay low along Route D191 heading
toward St-Lô, while a map or message is read (lower left corner).


A stretch of D191 today - perhaps the same location.

By the morning of 18 July, unrelenting pressure on the enemy had loosened up the whole front east of the Vire River. The 35th Division reported that the enemy had pulled out along its entire sector, leaving a considerable amount of materiel. Early in the day, General Corlett told General Gerhardt to take St-Lô and secure it. He wanted to find out "what was in there" before anything further was launched. The attack was to be made by Task Force C, especially organized for speed and headed by General Cota. Consisting of reconnaissance, tank, tank destroyer, and engineer elements, the task force was ordered to get infantry support from the nearest available infantry unit just prior to the entrance into the city.

The initial objective within St-Lô, chosen after previous aerial reconnaissance, was a square near the cemetery that had been relatively untouched by bombing. The plan was to clear and occupy this square for use as a base of operations within the town. The 29th Reconnaissance Troop entered St-Lô first and pushed through the rubble-choked streets, using any possible course or route. When it became impossible to proceed farther in vehicles, the men dismounted and deployed like infantry, moving rapidly to seize and organize three strongpoints, previously determined and assigned. The tanks, TD's, and infantry followed the reconnaissance troop into town. A CP (Command Post) was set up at the three-way junction of the main highways. This soon became an exceedingly hot place as, in addition to the artillery fire coming from the high ground to the south of town, an 88-mm gun was firing down the Bayeux road.

CLICK ON PICTURES TO ENLARGE

Men of Task Force C go down a winding street not yet too damaged
(until German artillery opens up) on 18 July 1944


Holes have been blown in walls which were still intact in the
earlier photograph (under the word "Restau---" on wall at left).
Bodies of American soldiers lie near the immobilized tank destroyer.
Shell cases fired by a tank destroyer litter the sidewalk.

As the infantry entered, men in groups of four and five were ticked off to accompany a tank or a TD (tank destroyer)and sent to posts commanding other key points throughout the town. There were 17 of these, including bridges, and they were swiftly outposted. Some of the important areas in the town, such as those originally seized by the 29th Reconnaissance Troop, were reinforced to constitute formidable strongpoints, composed of an armored car, two tanks, two TDs, and an antitank gun. Other outposts were held by small groups of infantrymen armed with bazookas and antitank grenades.

By 1900 after a series of skirmishes by the forces which were fanning through the city, St-Lô was firmly secured. It seemed evident that the Germans had been surprised by the speed and boldness of the task force maneuver. Swiftness in getting the column past the important road junction and dispersed before the enemy artillery could bring full force to bear on it was a prime factor in the speedy occupation. General Gerhardt hastened to inform General Corlett of the victory: "I have the honor to announce to the Corps Commander that Task Force C of the 29th Division secured the city of St-Lô after 43 days of continual combat from the beaches to St-Lô."

Major Thomas D. Howie, a battalion commander within the 29th Inf
Div, told his men on 17 July, "I'll see you in Saint-Lô!" He was
killed moments later leading his battalion through the outskirts of
St. Lô. On 18 July, to honor him, his men fulfilled his promise,
and laid him under a flag on the steps of the Holy Cross Church.

Below: Holy Cross (St. Croix) Church then and now:
  

Although the city was captured, Task Force C continued to receive severe enemy fire. The infantry not posted at strongpoints had worked its way through the battered streets to clear the bombed remnants of the town from east to west of any snipers or resistance pockets, few of which were encountered. But the enemy continued to pour mortar and artillery fire throughout St-Lô, searching out points here and there as though moving methodically over a checkerboard. A mortar shell caused the death of several men with whom Colonel Ednie (now commanding the 115th Infantry) was conferring at the CP, although the colonel himself escaped injury. At 1930 General Cota was wounded by shell fragments and had to be evacuated. Capt. Sydney A. Vincent, Jr., of Company B, 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion, left his vehicle to coordinate the activities of his tank destroyers and was killed. A forward observer of the 29th Division Artillery reconnoitered one of the spires in the church of Notre-Dame as an observation post. He decided upon its use and went to gather his crew. By the time he had returned, the enemy had shot both spires off the church.

CLICK ON PICTURES TO ENLARGE

Remains of Notre Dame Church in July of 1944


Notre Dame Church as it was somewhat re-built.