15 June, 1944

No letter today. Just this:

* TIDBIT *
about Hedgerows and the French Countryside

CLICK ON DIAGRAM TO ENLARGE

Diagram of a hedgerow

The terrain features of the French countryside had a particularly strong influence on the conduct of operations. The terrain on the Allied left, held by the British Second Army, was an expanse of gently rolling pastures and cultivated fields. The relatively dry and firm ground in the British sector facilitated armor operations and the construction of forward airfields. The boundary line between the British Second Army and the U.S. First Army began on the coast near Port-en-Bessin and extended inland for approximately twenty miles, ending a few miles east of the village of Caumont. The U.S. First Army was responsible for operations along a wide arc that stretched westward from Caumont to the port of Cherbourg, a frontage of more than fifty miles.

Within a few days after the Allied invasion of Normandy, the U.S. Army found itself facing a stubborn opponent on terrain that favored the defender. Units fought desperately for hills, towns, and bridges that had become of strategic importance. At every turn, the Americans faced the seasoned veterans of the German Army. The effects of weather and especially terrain had a direct influence on the conduct of operations, while the dispositions and defensive capabilities of the German Army crucially dictated American actions.

Unlike the terrain in the British sector, the ground held by the U.S. First Army did not favor mobile operations. The American sector on the left, the ground between the boundary line with the British and the Vire River, was broken and uneven.The countryside in this sector was a patchwork of small hills, low ridges, narrow rivers, and steep valleys that hampered long-range observation and impeded cross-country movement. The center of the American sector was low ground that contained extensive marshlands. The whole area was drained by the Taute and Vire Rivers, which empty into the English Channel near Carentan and Isigny, respectively. The marshlands were flat, and the ground was soft and moist making travel by foot difficult, with vehicle traffic being almost impossible. Heavy rains made the marshlands even less passable, restricting movement to the few asphalt roads that traverse the bogs. On the American right, the terrain was more favorable. Between the marshes in the center of the sector and the coastline on the extreme right flank, a group of hills rose up to dominate the northern end of the Cotentin Peninsula. The most important terrain feature on the American right was the city of Cherbourg with its extensive port facilities.

Despite these natural obstacles, the most pervasive and formidable barrier in the American sector was man-made. For centuries, Norman farmers had enclosed the plots of their arable land, pastures as well as orchards, with thick hedgerows. The hedgerows were sturdy embankments, half earth, half hedge. At their base, they varied in thickness from one to four feet, with heights from three to fifteen feet. Growing out of this earthen wall was a hedge that consisted of small trees and tangles of vines and brush. This vegetation had a thickness of one to three feet and varied in height from three to fifteen feet. The hedgerows surrounded each field, breaking the terrain into numerous walled enclosures. Because the fields were small, about 200 by 400 yards in size, and usually irregular in shape, the hedgerows were numerous and set in no logical pattern. Each field had an opening in the hedgerow that permitted access for humans, livestock, and farm equipment. For passage to fields that are not adjacent to regular highways, numerous wagon trails ran through the hedgerows.

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Soldiers in trench between hedgerows, 10 June 1944


A breach in a hedgerow


A machine gun is set up in a hedgerow

The military features of the hedgerows are obvious. They divided the country into tiny compartments, providing excellent concealment to the defender a formidable obstacle to the attacker. The thick vegetation limited the deployment of units and restrict observation, making the effective use of heavy-caliber direct-fire weapons almost impossible and hampering the adjustment of artillery fire. Anyone occupying a high place that afforded good fields of observation and a clear view of the surrounding countryside had a distinct advantage.

The uneven and compartmentalized nature of this area meant paved roads were important. The main highways either paralleled the coast or stretched inland to the interior of Normandy. Carentan, in the center of the First Army's sector, was a vital road junction. From there, good highways ran eastward to Périers and La Haye-du-Puits. East of Carentan, two parallel roads ran south to Saint-Lo, which was perhaps the most vital road junction in the First Army sector. Like spokes on a wheel, roads ran from Saint-Lo in almost every direction. The force that could hold Saint-Lo would retain control over much of the road network in the wooded countryside.

Like the terrain, the weather also influenced operations in Normandy. More than anything else, persistent rains during June and July hampered the efforts of the U.S. Army. The early summer of 1944 was the wettest since 1900. Extended periods of rainy weather turned the marshlands west of Carentan into a bottomless morass, making cross-country movement impossible. Rains also added immeasurably to the daily miseries endured by the foot soldier. Low visibility and cloud ceilings often grounded all aircraft, denying the ground forces the support of fighter-bombers and aerial observers that was so desperately needed. The extent of daylight was also important. Extremely long days put a premium on the hours of darkness. Nighttime was used to rearm, resupply, rest, and plan for the next day's operations. Short nights limited the amount of time for these activities, and early dawns often found exhausted American units unprepared to conduct an attack or to defend against counterattacks.